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Purpose: With the intention to provide new evidence valid for the Scandinavian market the 
thesis aims to; (I) examine the announcement effect for acquiring companies, where the 
emphasis lies on the difference between acquiring Public targets compared to Private targets, 
and (II) investigate the relation between abnormal returns and variables found significant in 
previous research. 
 
Theoretical Framework: The concept of mergers and acquisitions is briefly introduced 
followed by relevant theories offering explanations to the occurrence of the announcement 
effect. The role of the management is discussed before presenting previous research within 
the field of announcement effect. The chapter ends with a discussion regarding market 
efficiency, impact of information and the private firm discount.     
 
Methodology: A quantitative approach is used where an Event study is conducted to 
determine the announcement effect. T-tests are performed to ensure statistical significance. 
Multiple linear regression models examine the effect of Relative size, Deal size, Form, Serial 
acquirer, Implied premium and target public status on abnormal returns.  
 
Empirical foundation: The data sample consists of Scandinavian public firms (listed on 
stock exchanges in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark) bidding for either public or 
private targets between 2004-01-01 and 2014-01-01.   
 
Conclusion: Statistical significant evidence of positive abnormal returns is found for the total 
sample. Furthermore the results indicate that acquisitions of privately held companies 
outperform deals for publicly traded firms, supporting the private firm discount. The relative 
size is found to have a generally positive impact on acquisitions, while deal size and premium 
is found to have a negative relation in acquisitions of public targets.     
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LIST	  OF	  ABBREVIATIONS	  	  
AAR – Average abnormal return 
AR – Abnormal return 
CAAR – Cumulative average abnormal return 
CAR – Cumulative abnormal return 
DCF – Discounted Cash-Flow  
EBITDA – Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization  
EMH – Efficient Market Hypothesis  
M&A – Mergers and Acquisitions  
P/E – Price-to-earnings  
WACC – Weighted average cost of capital  
 
DEFINITIONS	  
The first time a, for the thesis relevant, concept is introduced (without a notation or definition 
in the text) it is written in italic, and the definition presented in Appendix 1.   
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1 INTRODUCTION	  
In the first chapter the reader is introduced to the subject of mergers and acquisitions and 
what has inspired the authors to conduct the research. The problem discussion is followed by 
the research questions and the purpose before ending the chapter with a short disposition.  
1.1 Background	  
The intrinsic value of a firm, and in consequence the value of its shares, depends on its ability 
to generate free cash-flow (FCF) exceeding the cost of capital (WACC) (Koller et al, 2010 p. 
17). The actual value of the firm, or the price that the shares trade at, will depend on the 
market's perception of future value creation (Fama, 1970). The share price thus reflects 
expectations in regards to the firm’s future performance. In an efficient market these 
expectations incorporates all historic as well as current information available (Fama, 1970). 
Once new information is released to the market the price will immediately mirror the 
anticipated impact on the firm’s future value creation (Fama, 1970). One example of an event, 
potentially affecting the markets expectations, is when a firm announces its intention to 
acquire another firm. The reason for mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is that the combination 
of two firms will generate a higher value together than if they were apart (Gaughan, 2011). 
This value enhancement is referred to as synergy effects, and in an economy with rational 
actors, e.g. managers and investors, the expected value impact of an acquisition 
announcement equals the expected value of the synergies, adjusted for the probability that the 
acquisition will actually take place (Malatesta & Thompson, 1985). This implies that, 
following an announcement, the maximum market adjustment of the acquirer and the target’s 
share prices respectively should, when added up, never exceed the expected synergies. The 
distribution of value between the bidder and the target will thus depend on the premium 
offered to the target, where the maximum premium a bidder would be willing to pay equals 
the expected value of the synergies (Misra & Gupta, 2007). 
 
However, the above stated argument assumes that the managers (of both the bidder and the 
target) and the market (1) got access to the same information, both in terms of quantity and 
quality, and (2) are rational, i.e. they can correctly reassess the value based on the available 
information (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). If these assumptions are met the managers and 
the market should have homogenous expectations regarding future value creation. As a result, 
the announcement of a deal will create value for the acquirers’ shareholders equal to [E]S-P, 
that is the expected value of the synergies less the premium paid to the target. The target 
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firm’s shareholders will on their part gain value equal to P, the premium. On the other hand if 
these assumptions are not met, and there would be information asymmetry and/or irrationality 
on the market, a discrepancy between the actors, i.e. managers’ and investors’, expectations 
could occur when assessing the synergies. This creates a possibility for M&A mispricing in 
two directions: (I) In terms of dividing the value between bidder and target there is a risk for 
the premium to exceed the actual synergies due to agency problems or behavioural factors 
influencing the management and (II) the divergence of expectations between the management 
and the shareholders could potentially cause over reactions or under action on the market.   
For these reasons, among others, the field of mergers and acquisitions has got much attention 
from researchers trying to explain the occurrence of abnormal price movements while also 
aiming to explain what drives the positive (negative) value creation (destruction) following 
announcements.       
1.2 Problem	  discussion	  
In a research paper Martynova and Renneboog (2008) provide a broad and extensive review 
of the empirical findings in the field of mergers and acquisitions over the past decades. Their 
study focuses on the determinants of M&A activity by analysing the five previous merger 
waves, and in respect to the development over the years they discuss the existing academic 
literature regarding short-term wealth effects for both the target and the acquirer in M&A 
deals. Even though the empirical research considering announcement effects are 
comprehensive, views do not converge of whom receives the value. The main part of the 
academic literature argues that the gain from a deal is captured by the target’s shareholders, 
whereas from a bidders' perspective the evidence varies with a value impact either negative, 
slightly positive or insignificantly different from zero following an announcement. 
Researchers such as Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) and Acquit, Bruner and Mullins (1982) both 
show a positive abnormal return for the bidding company of 0.1% and 0.2% respectively. 
These findings are supported by Goergen and Ronneborg (2004) claiming that the bidder 
receives a positively significant market return of 0.7%. In contrast, empirical studies such as 
Jensen and Ruback (1983), Moeller, Shilingemann and Stultz (2006) and Bieshaar, Knight 
and Wassenaer (2001), among others all state that the acquirer receives an abnormal return of 
zero or slightly negative on average. (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008) 
 
However, it is important to notice that all studies mentioned above are based on acquisitions 
of publicly listed companies. In fact, most of the previous research within the field of mergers 
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and acquisition solely focuses on public bidders acquiring public targets. The analysis of 
acquisitions of non-public firms has for a long time been ignored even though the occurrence 
of such deals represents the majority of the transactions (Draper & Paudyan, 2006). For the 
U.S. market 60-75% of the acquisitions were private target firms (Capron & Shen, 2007), 
whereas, acquisitions of privately held firms represent 80% of the total number of takeovers 
in the U.K. (Draper & Paudyal, 2006).  
 
Draper and Paydyal (2006) further argue that previous conclusions derived from acquisitions 
of publicly traded targets may not be appropriate in explaining the wealth effects resulting 
from an acquisition of a private target, as the two are different in several ways, e.g. in terms of 
liquidity, information availability and average deal size (Capron & Shen, 2007). Empirical 
evidence provided by Chang (1998), Officier, Poulsen and Stegemoller (2008), Fuller, Netter 
and Stegemoller (2002) and Capron and Shen (2007) support this by showing significant 
differences in abnormal returns for bidders in private firm acquisitions compared to bidders 
for public targets. Kopelin, Atulya and Alan (2000) among others refer to these differences in 
market returns as the private firm discount. The causes for the discount are not yet fully 
determined although several academics have presented their views. Kopelin, Atulya and Alan 
(2000) suggest that illiquidity is the main reason for the discount whereas Capron and Shen 
(2007) claim that information availability is the most prominent variable explaining why 
acquirers receive a positive market return in private firm acquisitions. In general, the lack of 
information regarding private companies increases the risk for biases in the evaluation process 
for the acquiring firm. The ability to exploit and accurately forecast the target is limited and 
investors therefore demand a discount of the target’s value.  
Moreover, other variables are shown to influence the value of bidders in general. For 
acquirers of public or private targets, the announcement effect can depend on; the relative size 
of the target to the acquirer (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989a; Misra & Gupta, 2007), whether an 
acquirer is making multiple acquisitions through a so called acquisition program or not (Fuller 
et al, 2002), or if the payment mode is cash or stock (Draper & Paudyal, 2006) among others.  
 
Yet, most of the research within the field of mergers and acquisitions is concentrated to either 
the U.S. or the U.K. market (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004), two countries associated with 
common law, strong management culture and a dispersed ownership structure (La Porta et al, 
2008). Differences in the legal framework as well as management culture and ownership 
structures between markets have an economic impact (La Porta et al, 2008); where in effect 
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
9	  
  
the levels of agency conflicts and information asymmetries may vary among countries. It is 
thus reasonable to believe that dissimilarities in market settings could question the validity of 
previous empirical findings.    
 
For this thesis the authors chose to examine the Scandinavian market as it consists of small 
and open economies with firms having a concentrated ownership structure (Oxelheim et al, 
2011), features that together with a different legal system1 could contribute to disparities in 
the market settings compared to the U.S. and the U.K. The Scandinavian market can also be 
considered as a rather stable and homogenous market making the measurement of the 
announcement effect less problematic. The total numbers of acquisitions over the past decade 
can be seen in Figure 1.1, where the M&A trend follow the development of the world in 
general (see Appendix 5). 
 
Figure 1.1: M&A activity in Scandinavia over the past decade 
 
The data represent the number acquisitions made by Scandinavian publicly traded companies between 2004 and 2013. The 
total number of acquisitions made by public Scandinavian companies was 17 786 deals where Sweden accounted for 7 764 
deals, Norway 4 316 deals, Denmark 3 017 deals and Finland 2 689 deals (see Appendix 2).  
Source: created by the Authors, based on data from Thompson Reuters Eikon 
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Also the distribution of deals seems rather homogenous for the countries over the time period. 
The acquisitions of private firms represent the majority of transactions across the period just 
as in the U.S. and the U.K. markets (see Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2: Acquisitions of Public and Private targets 
 
The data represents the total number of acquisitions reported in Thompson Reuters Eikon, for each Scandinavian country 
between 2004 and 2014, where publicly listed firms bid for either public or private targets (see Appendix 3).  
Source: created by the Author, based on data from Thompson Reuters Eikon 
 
Altogether most research on the announcement effect of mergers and acquisitions focus solely 
on publicly listed firms acquiring public targets where there are varying results in regards to 
value creation. Even so, acquisitions of private targets are more common in practice and 
empirical findings suggest a private firm discount where bidders receive positive returns on 
average when acquiring private targets. Despite extensive research, the causes for this private 
firm discount are not yet fully determined. Furthermore the main research body is conducted 
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Scandinavian market. This raises the question whether evidence of the private firm discount 
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1.3 Research	  question(s)	  
• Is there a difference in the announcement effect for an acquiring company if a bid is 
made for a public target compared to a private target?  
• Which of the determinants, previously found to explain abnormal returns, are relevant 
for acquirers of public and private targets respectively?  
1.4 Purpose	  
With the intention to provide new evidence valid for the Scandinavian market the thesis aims 
to; (I) examine the announcement effect for acquiring companies, where the emphasis lies on 
the difference between acquiring Public targets compared to Private targets, and (II) 
investigate the relation between abnormal returns and variables found significant in previous 
research. 
1.5 Disposition	  	  
Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework  
In this chapter the concept of mergers and acquisitions will briefly be introduced followed by 
relevant theories offering explanations to the occurrence of the announcement effect. The role 
of the management will primarily be discussed before presenting previous research within the 
field. The chapter ends with a discussion regarding market efficiency, impact of information 
and the private firm discount.     
Chapter 3 – Methodology 
The chapter is introduced with a thorough walk-through of the Event study methodology. This 
is followed by a section on the statistical test procedures before constructing the regression 
models. Lastly the validity and reliability of the thesis is addressed.  
Chapter 4 – Results & Analysis 
In this chapter the empirical findings will be presented, followed by analysis of the results in 
regards to previous presented research and theory.  
Chapter 5 – Conclusions 
In this final chapter the authors ties the purpose of the thesis to the results and answers the 
research questions followed by a further discussion of the most relevant findings. Finally 
proposals for future research are presented.  
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2 THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
In this chapter the concept of mergers and acquisitions will briefly be introduced followed by 
relevant theories offering explanations to the occurrence of the announcement effect. The role 
of the management will primarily be discussed before presenting previous research within the 
field. The chapter ends with a discussion regarding market efficiency, impact of information 
and the private firm discount.       
 
2.1 Mergers	  and	  Acquisitions	  (M&A)	  
The terminology Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) has become generally used when referring 
to all kinds of corporate takeovers. In particular, there are three ways of how a firm can 
acquire another firm; merger or consolidation, acquire a target company’s stock or acquire a 
company’s assets. In short, the differences lie in whether two companies merge into an 
entirely new company, or if a company purchases another company (friendly or hostile). The 
former usually takes place when two companies, of the same size, decide to become one 
instead of operating separately in which both companies’ stocks are given up and new stocks 
are issued in its place. In an acquisition, in contrast, an acquirer purchases the stocks, or the 
assets, of a target company which cease to exist. The target becomes as a part of the acquirer, 
meaning no requirements of exchanging reserves to alliance as a new company. (Brealey et al, 
2011 p. 571)  
2.1.1 Managerial	  motives	  for	  mergers	  and	  acquisitions	  
For many companies, a fundamental reason to acquire another company is to expand the 
business. Companies seeking growth opportunities can achieve this through internal growth or 
by acquiring another company. Indeed, both strategies involve opportunities and risks. 
Whether it is organic growth or acquired growth careful planning and execution needs to be 
ensured to create future value. (Gaughan, 2011 p. 117) 
Internal growth represents organic and natural growth of the core company. Organic growth 
requires time, as the process of expanding the business must be done in a prudential way 
where each process of the firm needs to be absorbed before expanding further. Companies 
growing organically face less internal challenges. Nevertheless, risks and uncertainties lie in 
the slow expansion process and an external competition. Corporations growing organically 
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may face an underinvestment problem2 abandoning important investment opportunities. In the 
long run, this may have a negative effect on their competitive position relative industrial 
peers. On the contrary, pursuing M&A allow companies to expand their business within the 
industry, or into new markets and geographic regions. Using M&A as a way to enter a new 
market or to obtain a new resource may be less risky and, in the long term, a cheaper 
alternative (Gaughan, 2011 pp. 117).  
 
The traditional model in corporate finance assumes that managers behave rationally to 
maximize shareholder value. The general assumption is that M&A activities solely are 
motivated by economic reasons, leading to an increased value. Nonetheless, the market 
reactions following M&A announcements suggest that the simplified assumptions of rational 
managers may not be true. When examining the causes for these market reactions one can 
look at the managers’ motives for M&A activities where it has been argued that M&As to 
some extent are driven by agency conflicts or irrational managerial behaviour such as hubris 
and over-confidence. Generally the academic literature refers to three main reasons, in 
addition to growth, for managers to get involved in mergers and acquisitions; the synergy 
motive, the hubris motive and the agency motive. (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993) 
2.1.2 The	  Synergy	  Hypothesis	  
In M&As, the term synergy interprets an ability for corporations to create more value as one 
entity rather than operating apart, e.g. company A merges with company B which creates 
value equal to (A+B)+S, where S is the synergy effect. The expected existence of synergies 
allows firms to follow through acquisitions while creating shareholder value in the process 
(Gaughan, 2011 p. 133; Berkovitch & Narayannan, 1993). In a world with rational managers 
and investors with homogenous expectations, the absence of synergies would most likely 
prevent any M&A activities. The reason for this is that the target company would trade at its 
true value and the bidder would ultimately pay the maximum of that true value. The target’s 
shareholders on the other hand would not be willing to sell their shares if there were nothing 
to be gained, i.e. if there were no premium offered. Even if the target’s shareholders would 
consent to a deal, there would be no value creation for neither of the companies’ shareholders, 
given an offer matching the true value. (Koller et al, 2010 p.318) The existence of synergies 
could however, as a rational managerial motive, explain value creation following an 
announcement.    
                                                            
2 An agency problem where the management avoid low-risk investments in order to maximize their own wealth at the cost of  
the company’s shareholders and debt holders (Culp, 2010). 
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There are several different ways to gain synergy effects which can be categorised into 
operational synergies and financial synergies, where the former are generated through revenue 
enhancement and cost reduction while financial synergies refer to a reduced WACC 
(Gaughan, 2011 p. 133).  
2.1.2.1 Operating	  synergies	  
2.1.2.1.1 Revenue	  enhancement	  
 
A common motive for mergers and acquisitions is increased revenues for the combined entity. 
Revenue enhancement can be achieved through increased market power as fewer competitors 
allow an individual firm to achieve higher earnings. However it is argued that revenue 
synergies are harder to estimate as well as realize in practice. It may be easy to generate sales 
by simply adding another company to the balance sheet but nevertheless harder to improve 
the overall profitability of the firm. (Gaughan, 2011 p. 119; Morck et al, 1990).  
2.1.2.1.2 Operating	  efficiency	  and	  Cost	  reduction	  
 
A fundamental argument for M&A is improved operating efficiency which leads to cost 
reduction. Cost reductions can be obtained through e.g. economies of scale and/or access to 
certain resources. A company obtains economies of scale when the average production cost 
decreases while the level of production increases. This allows a company to rationalise its 
operations and to spread its overhead costs3. For example, a larger corporation could yield a 
scale in production as the two operations are integrated (Pike & Neale, 2009 p. 559). Another 
advantage of M&A is that it allows a firm to acquire critical resources instead of internally 
develop and produce them. It is, in fact, rather common that larger corporations acquire 
smaller firms or start-ups. This is because many smaller firms hold products but lack capacity 
and resources to produce, or sell it. Larger firms, in contrast, find it too expensive to develop 
these specific products in terms of engineering and know-how. The two firms hence have 
complementary resources and will both benefit of M&A. (Brealey et al, 2011 p. 576; Ross et 
al, 2003 p. 825) 
2.1.2.2 Financial	  synergies	  
Financial synergies refer to improvements in the WACC of the acquiring firm or the 
combined entity. Synergies can be reached through corporate diversification which is a 
common motive to engage in M&A as a way to reduce dependency on the exciting business 
                                                            
3 Overhead costs are costs not directly related to production of good sold, such as heat, electricity and rent (Brealey et al, 
2001). 
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model and therefore the risk. The argument for risk reduction is based on the debt co-
insurance hypothesis where economic gains are likely to be captured as the acquirer and target 
have less then perfectly positively correlated cash flow streams. Lower risk and volatility4  
may lead to a lower probability of default of the combined entity and thus a reduced WACC. 
(Gaughan, 2011 p. 144) In addition, as the cost of issuing securities is related to size, the total 
costs of issuing debt or equity are lower for larger corporations (Ross et al, 2003 p. 829).  
However, it has been argued that shareholders do not benefit from corporate diversification. 
In a perfect capital market shareholders have already diversified away its unsystematic risk5 
through portfolio management and will therefore not exclusively benefit from corporate 
diversification (Pike & Neale 2009, p. 561; Amihud & Lev, 2001).  
2.1.2.3 Strategic	  types	  of	  acquisitions	  	  
Motivating synergies is one thing, but realizing them in practice by incorporating M&A 
strategies is another. Mergers and acquisitions can be categorised into three strategic types: 
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate acquisitions. A horizontal acquisition is when a 
company acquires a competitor within the same industry in order to enhance its competitive 
position relative industrial peers. Feasible synergies may be economies of scale and improved 
market power. (Gaughan, 2007 p. 164) In a vertical acquisition a company acquires a target 
within the same industry but at a different stage in the supply chain. This can be done through 
a forward or a backward integration i.e. either an acquisition of a supplier, distributor, or a 
customer. Potential synergetic motives can be explained in terms of lower transaction costs 
for the acquiring firm, improved market power, and quality maintenance among others. 
Finally, an acquisition in which the acquirer and the target company are not related can be 
referred as a conglomerate acquisition, also known as a diversifying acquisition where 
financial synergies could be achieved (Gaughan, 2007 p. 155). 
2.1.2.4 Estimating	  and	  Valuing	  Synergies	  	  
The fundamental principle in the field of corporate finance is creating shareholder value. 
Companies create value by investing in capital as a way to generate future cash flow at a rate 
of return that exceeds the company’s cost of capital, simple as that. What drives the value is 
growth in relation to an improved rate of return, or put differently, to create value a company 
                                                            
4 Systematic risk 
5 Firm specific risk, a risk that specifically affects a firm or an asset. Also referred as, diversifiable risk or unique risk (Ross 
et al, 2002). 
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must either increase future free cash flows (FCFF) or lower the WACC.6 (Koller et al, 2010 p. 
17)  
As stated above, the value creation for acquiring firms in M&A deals depend on the 
synergies, i.e. the improved cash-flow, and the premium offered to the target. Both the 
management and the investor’s of an acquiring firm will assess the expected synergies in a 
deal. The management will base their bid on their estimation of the synergies while the 
investor’s will revise the share price according to the difference between their estimated value 
of the synergies and the management’s bid (Koller et al, 2010 pp. 445). The importance of a 
correct valuation can thus not be neglected as potential biases in the assessment may destroy 
value. The risk for over estimating the synergies and consequently paying an excessive 
amount for the target is arguably the worst outcome even though discrepancies between 
manager’s and investor’s calculations may cause temporary misalignments in the share price 
(Koller et al, 2010 pp. 445).       
It is argued by Schweiger and Very (2003) that the acquirer’s ability to estimate a correct 
value based on future forecast is critical in the future value creation of a deal and thus its 
ability to ensure that cash-flow is realized prior closing. One needs to have access to certain 
information in order to accurately estimate the value impact of the synergy effects as the more 
hypothetical assumptions included, the more unreliable the outcome become. Furthermore, 
circumstances which occur prior to closing the deal might change the presumptions 
substantially. (Schweiger & Very 2003)  
 
Two of the most commonly used valuation methods, which could be applied when assessing 
the potential value creation in M&A deals, are the DCF model and the Multiples valuation 
method (Koller et al, 2010). The DCF approach uses accounting information to estimate 
future cash-flow while the multiples valuation is less complex as it requires rather simple 
calculations, without too much detailed information, but still determines a fairly good 
approximation of the value of the firm. It thus provides the investors with enough information 
whether the asset is worth buying or not. However, a disadvantage is that the multiples 
valuation does not take into consideration whether a company is currently over or under 
valued and could therefore fail to estimate an adequate value. (Koller et al, 2010) Both these 
methods works fairly well when valuing publicly listed firms where enough information is 
available to the market. For private firms however, which is neither required to publicly 
disclose its accounts nor have current market values of its share prices, both valuation 
                                                            
6 The value creation is the change in value due to improved performance (Koller et al, 2010). 
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methods become cumbersome to utilize. Furthermore, as there are different expectations of 
future performance, the models may present different estimations of value. In turn, valuation 
has become a challenge for individuals seeking the intrinsic value of a target company. 
Agarwal and Zeephongsekul (2013) state that behavioural factors have a substantial impact on 
the pricing of target companies. Due to biased beliefs and psychological factors disrupting, 
traditional financial valuation models may provide inaccurate estimations of the target 
company. (Agarwal & Zeephongsekul, 2013) 
2.1.3 The	  Hubris	  Hypothesis	  
Hubris as a possible explanation for value destroying acquisitions and takeovers was proposed 
by Richard Roll in 1986. Roll’s (1986) theory suggests that managers engage in acquisitions 
with an optimistic belief of their own ability to create future value. Henceforth overbidding 
for the target company, i.e. pay a premium exceeding the expected synergies, which affects 
their shareholders negatively. If an investment has no potential gains, hubris is the only 
explanation of why managers do not abandon a specific investment. (Roll, 1986) 
 
The Hubris theory suggests an efficient financial market, where investors are rational whereas 
managers are irrational. Roll (1986) empirically provides evidence of stock market reactions 
following to a takeover driven by hubris. He poses that the stock price of the acquiring 
company will fall as shareholders oppose the deal. In contrast, the stock price of the target 
company will increase since price paid exceeds the true value of the target firm. All together, 
the net value will end up slightly negative for the combined entity. If this value would, for 
some reason, turn out positive it is because of an overestimation by an overconfident manger. 
(Gaughan, 2011 p. 157; Roll, 1986) However, it is important to acknowledge that the target 
company’s value only increases if the takeover is successful (Roll, 1986).  
Maletesta (1983) support this argument stating that, in acquisitions driven by agency related 
problems, the value of the target firm will increase and, in reverse, decrease for the acquiring 
firm. Roll (1986) further explains that the worst acquisitions are, most often, made by well 
performing mangers, as they tend to overstate their personal ability.  
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) state that, when an acquisition is motived by hubris the 
synergies are zero. Taking this into consideration, a potential overpayment represents a 
transfer to the target company. Therefore, the higher gain for the target, the lower gain for the 
acquiring company. (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993) 
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The winner’s curse hypothesis is another theory based on behavioural fallacies. It states that 
the acquirer, i.e. the winner of a bid, is the actor who overestimated the true value of the target 
the most (Varaiya, 1988). Or put somewhat differently, the most overly optimistic actor 
regarding the value of the target, its synergies, future performance etc. The degree of the 
winner’s curse, i.e. the size of the winner’s premium paid, is due to two factors: (1) how 
opinions regarding the value of the target differ among the bidders and (2) the competition, 
i.e. the number of potential bidders in the auction. Varaiya (1988)7 show empirical evidence 
that in an average acquisition the winning bid overstates the capital markets estimation of the 
value by 67%, i.e. overpay substantially for the target company. This supports Roll’s (1986) 
argument that bidding firms with hubris overpay for targets and a manger acting on hubris 
increases the likelihood that a company end up with a winners curse (Varaiya, 1988).  
2.1.3.1 Behavioural	  Finance	  
The hubris theory focuses on the management’s biased decision-making and is derived from 
behavioural theory. According to behavioural finance the investors on the market can also 
have their rational judgements affected by psychological factors. There are three predominant 
themes within the literature of behavioural finance: heuristic driven biases, frame dependence, 
and market inefficiencies (Shefrin, 1999). 
2.1.3.1.1 Biases	  	  
 
A bias can be explained as a predisposition toward error. There are four different biases 
influencing individuals, namely; excessive optimism, overconfidence, confirmation and 
illusion of control. Excessive optimism is an error in the estimated probability of an outcome 
where the frequency of favourable (unfavourable) results are overestimated (underestimated). 
Overconfidence in ones ability or knowledge, i.e. when believing and/or viewing oneself as 
better than average, provides a higher likelihood of making mistakes. Confirmation bias is 
when too much importance is attached to information supporting, relative information 
opposing, the existing point of view. Finally, individuals tend to overestimate the extent to 
which they can control the outcome of events.  (Shefrin, 2007)  
2.1.3.1.2 Heuristics	  	  	  	  	  
 
When in a decision making process, individuals tend to make biased assessments based on 
four heuristics, i.e. rules of thumb. Representativeness is when judgments are based on 
                                                            
7 Examining 800 mergers and acquisitions, between 1974 and 1983 (Varaiya, 1988). 
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stereotypical categorizations. Failure to recognize important exogenous factors when drawing 
conclusions based on simple similarities may cause incorrect decisions. Another heuristic is 
the tendency of drawing conclusions based on information that is easily accessible rather than 
less noticeable and more abstract. The availability of information does not indicate its 
relevance to the matter in question. When evaluating future performance based on historical 
figures people tend to make insufficient adjustments in their calculations, causing an 
anchoring bias in their expectations. The fourth heuristic is the propensity of basing decisions 
on an irrational state of mind, intuition or instinct. (Shefrin, 2007) 
2.1.3.1.3 Framing	  effects	  
 
The Prospect Theory emphasizes how rational individuals make risky decisions, often with a 
monetary motive, based on the expected outcome rather than the final wealth. In particular, 
outcomes are evaluated with respect to the reference point; whether it is a gain or a loss. This 
is further seen as a critical part of the decision making since individuals tend to treat risks 
related to perceived losses differently than risks related to perceived gains. Thus, people are 
more risk averse in decisions involving gains while risk seeking in decisions involving losses. 
Khaneman and Tversky (1970) further explain that value function is concave for gains and 
convex for losses (referred to as the reflection effect) (Khaneman & Tversky, 1970; Levy, 
199). Levy (1992) explains that a loss aviation tendency predisposes individuals to 
overvaluing things they own. Hence, when acquiring an object the value of that object 
increases. Levy (1992) calls this the “over-valuation endowment effect”, suggesting that 
selling prices should be higher than buying prices. (Levy, 1992) 
2.1.4 The	  Agency	  theory	  
The third managerial motive for pursuing mergers and acquisitions is based on the principal 
agency theory. Academics claim that managers may aim at growth for personal reasons at the 
cost of the company’s market value, rather than to act in favour of the shareholders.  
 
The agency theory is well known in the academic literature explaining the relationship 
between managers and shareholders. Theoretically, the primary goal for a manager is to 
maximise the shareholder value. It is, however, suggested that M&A to some extent can be 
motivated by agency problems where managers aim to increase their own welfare. Two 
fundamental motives are used in explaining why managers tend to favour M&A: (1) as 
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growth increases, power and control increases as well (Jensen, 1986) and (2) it allows 
managers to diversify, reducing their own managerial risk (Amihud & Lev, 2001).  
 
The academic literature uses diversification as a motive for mergers and acquisition as a way 
to reduce risk. However, as stressed earlier, such risk reduction is less beneficial for 
shareholders as they can achieve this effect though portfolio management. It is therefore 
argued that managers use diversification to reduce their own managerial risk (Amihud & Lev, 
2001). By making “manager-specific investments” managers build a dependency of the firm 
to their skills (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993 p. 348) making it more costly for shareholders 
to lose them, thus lowering the probability of being replaced (Shleifer & Visny, 1988). Morck 
et al (1990) claims that an acquirer with managerial motives tends to overpay for the target 
company and hence substantially reduce the value for its shareholders. In particular, if an 
investment provides a manager with personal benefits, this individual will, most likely choose 
this investment even though it is overvalued. The NPV of this investment, compared to an 
investment without personal motives, will be substantially higher. It will however result in a 
primarily negative announcement return for the company while the target firm receives the 
premium (Morck et al, 1990). Consequently the more severe agency problem, the higher 
premium paid and the higher gain for the target company (Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). 
All together, the agency problem creates a conflict of interest as managers, theoretically, 
should act as agents to maximise shareholder value. Instead they use value-destroying 
acquisitions for their own welfare (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Using acquisitions as a way to deploy capital is yet another potential reason for M&A 
activity, driven by agency conflicts. Firms with excess cash may find themselves as targets for 
hostile takeovers. One option for such a firm would be to distribute the surplus to its 
shareholders either as dividend payments or to repurchase its own shares. However managers 
may rather want to reinvest the capital for personal reasons and instead of paying 
shareholders, companies uses M&A as strategic way to redeploy surplus capital. The problem 
is that, as maturing firms may hold substantial amount of cash, but lacking investment 
opportunities, there may not be any positive NPV projects to invest in (Brealey et al, 2011 p. 
588). Jensen (1986) argues that companies with high free cash flows tend to invest in negative 
NPV projects rather than to pay dividends which is in contrast with the standard corporate 
finance theory; that managers want to maximise shareholder value and pay its shareholders 
though dividends. (Jensen, 1986)   
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2.2 Previous	  research	  on	  the	  Announcement	  effect	  
The academic research within the field of M&A announcement effects are extensive with 
empirical evidence suggesting that targets shareholders earn a significant average abnormal 
return (AAR) following an announcement whereas from a bidders’ perspective the evidence 
varies with abnormal return either negative, slightly positive or insignificantly different from 
zero (Andrare et al, 2001). How the market responds to an announcement is presumably 
dependent upon the markets expectations about the acquirer, the target and the deal 
characteristics. When analysing previous studies, where various explanations are presented, 
one can assume that the market seems to prefer certain characteristics more than others.  
 
Using event studies to analyse shareholder wealth has been the dominant approach for 
decades. The event study methodology is based upon the assumption that new information, 
associated with an M&A announcement, are introduced to the market such that investor’s 
expectations are updated and reflected in the stock price of the acquiring firm causing 
abnormal returns (AR). A further elaboration is introduced in section 3.2.  
 
Jarrell and Poulsen’s (1989a) empirical work suggests a positive abnormal return for the 
acquiring company’s shareholders. With significant findings they claim that the relative size 
of a public target to the bidder is an important determinant in explaining the return to the 
bidding firm. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) further analyse the relative size by 
looking at the differences in cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for large public firms 
acquiring either a public target or a private target. They found that, in deals of public targets, 
the larger public target relative the bidder, the more negative CAR for the acquirer. In 
contrast, in deals of private targets, the larger private target relative the bidder the more 
positive CAR for the acquirer. They further describe the negative CAR, in deals with public 
targets, via a stronger negotiation position for larger targets and greater difficulties in 
integration. In contrast, the positive market return in acquisitions of private firms could once 
again be explained in terms of a private firm discount, i.e. lower uncertainty in regards to a 
larger private target company. In addition, the market returns for the acquirer, in an 
acquisition of private targets, is greater if the mode of payment is stock rather than cash. 
(Fuller et al, 2002; Draper & Paudyal, 2006)  
As the relative size increases the synergy effect and economic gains will increase as well, 
leading to a positive abnormal return. Draper and Paudyal (2006) argue that acquisitions of 
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smaller targets generate less synergies and, in consequence, the acquirer may not notice a 
reaction in their share price. In contrast, if the target firm is large the monetary value of the 
assumed synergies may noticeably influence the value of the acquirer. (Draper & Paudyal, 
2006) 
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2003) also examine whether the size of the acquirer has an 
effect on the announcement return of the acquiring firm’s shareholders. They find a 2% 
higher market return for smaller acquirers 8  compared to larger acquirers, on average. 
Furthermore the average premium paid in acquisitions by large firms is 68% as against 62% 
for small firms. This suggests that the higher premium paid for a target company, the lesser 
value for the acquiring company’s shareholders. Moeller et al (2004) further emphasise that 
larger companies tend to be more overconfident regarding their acquisition strategy resulting 
in overpayment and this, as previously pointed out, will have a negative effect on the 
announcement return for the acquirer. Another explanation is that larger companies have a 
higher equity capitalization and are hence more likely to be overvalued, and as argued by 
Culp (2010), overvalued companies tend to use stock as payment method. If an overvalued 
acquirer decides to buy a public target with stock the likelihood of negative abnormal returns 
for the acquirer’s shareholder increases (Dong et al, 2002). In contrast, if an overvalued firm 
acquires a private target using stock this would, theoretically, influence the market return 
positively. However the acquirer’s large size may still impact the deal negatively.  
 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) analyse the market reaction of large deals in terms of the size 
of the price offer and show empirical evidence of a significant positive abnormal return for 
the target company, however, the return for the acquiring company’s shareholders cannot be 
generalized.  
It is further argued by Fuller, Alexandridis and Travlos (2011) that larger acquisitions destroy 
more value for the acquiring company’s shareholders compared to smaller, simply because of 
investor’s uncertainty in regards to larger and more complex deals. Loderer and Martin 
(1990), on the other hand, claim that acquirers lose more in large deals because of 
overpayment due to managerial over-confidence. Gordon, Kahl and Rosen (2009) on the 
contrary suggest that a less competitive market for larger targets reduces the number of 
potential acquirers and thus mitigates the winner’s curse problem. This would lead to a lower 
acquisition premium and hence positive return for larger deals.  
                                                            
8 The result is excluding payment method and deal characteristics (Moeller, Schlingemann & Stulz, 2003). 
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Given the contradicting predictions regarding the relationship between size and premiums 
Fuller, Alexandridis and Travlos (2011) provide evidence9 that acquirers pay a significantly 
lower premium in larger deals. However they find that large acquisitions are more likely to 
destroy value as well as negatively influence the operating performance, despite a lower 
premium offer. They suggest that the complexity in regards to integration prevent larger deals 
from capturing assumed synergies following the acquisition, leading to value destruction.   
 
Capron and Shen (2007) argue that the level of acquisition experience may influence market 
returns. Bidders with less experience face a higher risk of adverse selection10 when acquiring 
a private firm relative a public traded firm. It has been argued that acquirers with experience 
have an advantage in screening for potential targets and in evaluating them more properly. 
Such bidders are thus more likely to choose to acquire a private target whereas a bidder with 
less experience may prefer a publicly traded firm as the market price allows the acquirer to 
easier assess a price of the target. (Capron & Shen, 2007) This may explain why some 
acquirers choose public targets although the theory argues that these deals tend to fail on 
average.  
 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) claim that pre-announcement signals may reduce the 
market surprise component of an M&A announcement. If a firm is known for being involved 
in M&A activity or an acquisition program, the stock price reaction following an M&A 
announcement will, according to their results, only represent the difference in market 
perceptions of that specific acquisition relative the perceptions of previous acquisitions 
because the impact of the acquisition is already incorporated in the stock price. (Fuller et al, 
2002) 
 
It is argued by Misra and Gupta (2007) that value-enhancing managers offer a premium if and 
only if they expect a deal to create value following an announcement. They found that 
managers pay a premium of 48% on average for a target and further suggest that, such a high 
premium could serve as a signal of quality leading to a higher shareholder return. (Misra & 
Gupta, 2007) 
 
                                                            
9 By examining a sample of 3 691 U.S. public acquisitions, announced between 1990-2000 (Fuller, Alexandridis & Travlos, 
2011). 
10 Arise when buyers and sellers has asymmetric information. Due to lack of information availability “bad” investments are 
more likely to be chosen. (Culp, 2010) 
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Bieshaar, Knight and van Wassenaer (2001) analyse the stock market, following an M&A 
announcement, of companies involved in corporate transactions. By using multivariate 
regression they examine certain variables, such as deal type, to explain the stock market 
returns. According to their results the market reacts more positively to acquisitions of stocks, 
i.e. a share of the total firm’s assets and thus its business, in comparison to acquisitions of 
certain assets where the market showed no particular reaction. The difference in abnormal 
return can be explained in terms of a higher degree of information asymmetry in asset 
acquisitions where it is harder to separate cash-flows generated by certain assets, rather than 
accounting for the whole business. Thus a discount is applied for acquisitions of assets. 
Considering these results it is more likely that assumed synergies are captured in an 
acquisition of stocks rather than in an acquisition of certain assets. (Bieshaar et al, 2001) 
 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002), and Draper and Paudyal (2006) both examine the 
impact of shareholder wealth in acquisitions of private and public targets. They agree that 
shareholders earn positive abnormal returns, but conclude that economic gains are highly 
dependent upon the target status, whether it is private or public. The bidding firm in 
acquisitions of private targets outperform those of public targets which either break-even or 
lose. The positive abnormal returns in private target deals are explained in terms of a discount 
investor’s demand for less liquid assets and information asymmetry, generally referred to as 
the private firm discount.  
 
Doukas, Holmén and Travlos (2002) study short-term shareholder wealth effects of Swedish 
takeovers, and claims that diversifying acquisitions lead to negative stock market reactions for 
acquiring companies. Focused acquisitions, on the other hand, results in greater synergies and 
operating efficiencies.  
 
It is argued by Rosen (2006) that the market return for the acquirer, at the announcement, can 
be explained in terms of new information released (whether synergies are likely to be 
captured or not), current market conditions as well as investor’s expectations. He thus 
provides empirical evidence showing that in times with an overall well-performing stock 
market an acquirer’s abnormal market return tends to be positive as well. 
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Schwert (1996) examine the relation between premiums paid in acquisitions of publicly 
traded firms and pre-announced stock price run-ups and mark-ups11. As stressed earlier, 
several academic studies have shown that acquirers pay a premium for public target firms. In 
addition, it is argued that the premium paid by the acquirer to the target can be divided into 
two parts, a pre-announcement stock price run-up and a post-announcement mark-up. The 
price run-up represents any price movements before the announcement day of the deal, i.e. the 
abnormal return obtained before the announcement day. Whereas, the mark-up represents the 
increase in the stock price at the announcement day caused by investors bidding up the price. 
(Schwert, 1996) 
 
The stock price run up can be explained in terms of e.g. illegal insider trading, rumours and 
media speculation. Meulbrock (1992) show that 40-50% of the stock price run-ups observed 
one month before the announcement occurs on days when insiders are trading. The abnormal 
return on an insider trading day is on average 3% which indicates that illegal insiders 
contribute to price run-ups. (Meulbrock, 1992) In contrast, Jarrell and Poulsen (1989b) 
discuss speculation in media as a potential source of stock price run-ups. It is argued by 
Schwert (1996) that bidder’s stock price run-ups are 0.1%, on average. The mark-ups, on the 
other hand are 0.1% on average.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
11 By studying 1 814 takeovers of publicly traded American targets, listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), between 1975 and 1991 (Schwert, 1996). 
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Table 2.1: Research summary of Announcement effects 
 
 
The table provides an overview of previous academic papers, which investigate the Announcement effect for public 
acquirers.  
Source: created by the Authors 
 
2.3 Efficient	  market	  theory	  
Fama (1970) claims that, in an efficient market the actual price of an individual security is an 
approximation of its intrinsic value. In an efficient market, new information is immediately 
reflected in actual share prices (Fama, 1979). Hence, an investor cannot make profit by 
trading on current available information (Jensen & Smith, 1984). 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that prices of individual securities are 
behaving as a random walk. The term random walk is used to characterise a set of prices 
where all are represented randomly from previous prices, i.e. information is immediately 
Researcher Sample,Period Country Sample,Size Event,Window CAAR,Bidder CAAR,Target Results/comments
Jarrell,and,
Poulsen,(1989) 1963%1986 The*U.S. 770
(%5*and*+5)*********
(%2*and*+1)*********
(%20*and*+10)
(+0.92%)**********
(+0.70)********
(+1.29%)
(+28.99%)*in***
(%20*and*+10)
Relative*size*of*the*target,*bidding*competition*of*the*target,*thus*
information*availability*at*the*time*of*the*bid,*will*affect*the*
acquirer’s*shareholder*return.
Andrade,,Mitchell,
and,Stafford,
(2001)
1973%1998 The*U.S. 4*000 (%1*and*+1)* (%0.7%) (+16%) Targets*shareholders*gain*in*M&As.*
Bieshaar,,Knight,
and,Van,
Wassenaer,(2001)
1994%1998 Europe 231 %%% Acquisition*of*stock:*(+2.7%) %%%
The*stock*market*reacts*more*positively*to*acquisitions*of*stocks,*i.e.*
a*share*of*the*total*assets,*in*comparison*to*acquisitions*of*certain*
assets.
Public*Targets:*******
(%1.00%)********
Private*Targets:*
(+2.08%)
%%%
Shareholder*wealth*for*acquirers*in*bids*of*public*and*private*
targets.*Relative*size*and*mode*of*payment*will*affect*the*acquirer’s*
shareholder*return.*Differences*in*market*return*can*be*explained*in*
terms*of*illiquidity*in*private*firms.
1st*bid:,,,,,,,,,*
Public*(%0.88%)*******
Private*(+3.22%)********
5th*bid:***************
Public*(%1.73%)*
Private*(+0.72%)*
%%%
Shareholder*return*of*acquisitions*in*an*acquisition*program.*CAR*of*
the*1st*and*the*5th*and*the*highest*bid*in*an*acquisition*program*
respectively.*Acquirer’s*return*on*the*5th*bid*will*contain*less*
information*as*the*market*learned*more*about*the*acquirer*and*the*
synergies.*
Doukas,,Holmén,
and,Travlos,
(2002)
1980%1995 Sweden 101 (%5*and*+5) Focused:*********(+0.54*%)*
Focused:**
(+0.22)
Diversifying*acquisitions*lead*to*negative*market*reactions*for*the*
bidder.*Focused*acquisitions*lead*to*synergies*and*operation*
efficiencies.*Target*gain*a*significant*abnormal*return.
Moeller,,
Schlingemann,
and,Stulz,(2004)
1980%2001 The*U.S. 12*023 (%1*and*+1)
All:*(+1.102%)*
Larger:*(+0.076%)*
Smaller:*(+2.318%)
%%%
Weighted*abnormal*announcement*return*is*1.1%.*CAR*depends*on*
size*of*the*acquirer.*Smaller*acquirers*receive*significant*positive*
CAR*at*the*announcement.*Larger*acquirers*insignificant*positive*
CAR*at*the*announcement
Goergen,and,
Renneboog,
(2004)
1993%2000 Europe 187 (%2*and*+2) (+0.7%) (+9%)
Large*acquisitions*(over*$100*USD).*The*status*of*a*takeover*bid*and*
mode*of*payment*has*an*impact*on*the*shareholder*return*for*the*
bidder*and*target.*Furthermore,*a*high*market%to%book*ratio*of*the*
target*leads*to*a*higher*bid*premium*but*affects*the*bidding*firm*
negatively.
Rosen,(2006) 1982%2001 The*U.S. 6*259* (%5*and*+5) (+0.49%) %%%
Evidence*of*merger*momentum,*In*times*with*an*overall*well%
performing*stock*market*an*acquirer’s*abnormal*market*return*
tends*to*be*positive*as*well.
Draper,and,
Paudyal,(2006) 1981%2001 The*U.K.
8*597***********
Public*targets:***
1*098*********
Private*targets:**
7*499
(%1*and*+1)
Public*Targets:*******
(%0.41%)********
Private*Targets:*
(+2.19%)
%%%
Acquirers*of*private*companies*earn*significant*positive*returns*
explained*in*terms*of*a*private*firm*discount*caused*by*illiquidity*and*
information*asymmetry.
Misra,and,Gupta,
(2007) 1981%2004 The*U.S. 503 (%1*and*+1) %%% %%% Acquirers*pay,*on*average,*a*48%*premium.*
Capron,and,Shen,
(2007) 1988%1992
Multi%
national
92****************
Public*targets:*
52***************
Private*targets:*
40
%%% %%% %%%
Shareholder*wealth*for*acquirers*in*bids*of*public*and*private*
targets.*Found*that*(1)*acquirers*choose*target*firm*based*in*
information*based*deal*attributes*and*(2)*that*bidders*acquiring*
private*targets*perform*better*in*comparison*to*bidders*acquiring*
public*targets.
Fuller,,Netter,,
and,Stegemoller,
(2002)
1990%2000 The*U.S.
2*516***********
Public*targets:*
456*************
Private*targets:***
2*060
(%2*and*+2)
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reflected in market prices and is independent of historical prices and future prices. (Malkiel. 
2003) This means that investors cannot make above-average return on trading based on 
historical prices as an attempt to predict future prices (Fama, 1970).  
 
Three market conditions for efficiency 
Fama (1970) presents three market conditions for an efficient market. The first condition 
suggests no transaction costs in trading of securities. The second condition refers to a market 
where all information is available to all actors, at no costs. Lastly, all actors in the market 
agree that current information reflects the current price for each individual security. 
Altogether, an efficient market is where all currently traded prices reflect all available 
information (Fama, 1970). Such a market may not exist in the real world due to transactions 
costs and information asymmetry. Even so, that does not mean the market is inefficient. It is 
argued that these conditions are preferred, however not necessarily required. (Fama, 1970)  
 
Fama (1970) further provides three classifications of efficiency. The first classification is 
weak form of market efficiency, where all historical prices are reflected in the current market 
price of an individual stock. No future activities or trends are reflected in the price. The use of 
technical analysis will therefore not add any value. (Fama, 1970)  
 
The semi-strong form of market efficiency suggests that in addition to historic prices, all 
available public information is reflected in the stock price. The only actor that can actually 
beat the market is the insider whom has access to monopolistic information. (Fama, 1970) 
 
The strong form of market efficiency implies that all information is reflected in the security 
price, including the insider information. Hence, all actors on the market have access to the 
same information. This implies that an efficient market does not allow investors to make 
above-average returns without taking risks. (Fama, 1970) 
 
Malkiel (2003) presents a more current view the EMH claiming that stock prices are efficient 
but less predictable. The argument relies on the assumption that psychological and 
behavioural fundamentals are reflected in the market price. However, the market can be 
efficient even if investors are irrational and despite volatility in stock prices.  
 
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
28	  
  
Grossman and Stinlitz (1980) claim that when a market is efficient there is no competiveness 
on the market, and therefore no beneficial investments. In such a market, paying to get 
additional information does not add any value, as the paying trader will get same information 
as the non-paying trader. Grossman and Stinlitz (1980) further explain that the only way 
trades can earn a positive return is if they can use their information taking a position which a 
uniformed trader would not. Supporters of the EMH agree that information should reflect 
current prices and that all investors have access to same information at no costs (Fama, 1987), 
if this argument holds no trader can earn extra return.  
2.3.1 The	  theory’s	  relevance	  to	  the	  thesis	  
If a public M&A announcement is made, which changes the markets perception of the firm’s 
value, the stock price in a market with semi-strong or strong efficiency should immediately 
reflect the new value. According to the EMH, given at least semi-strong market efficiency, 
any stock price changes directly following an announcement should only contain the 
exogenous information regarding the event, because all other information is assumed to 
already be incorporated in the stock price. Furthermore, it is only the unpredicted part of the 
deal that should be reflected in the stock price hence any abnormal return could be explained 
through changes in the markets expectations.   
All together, the implications of EMH serve as an important foundation for this thesis in 
regards to the interpretation of the results. If management overestimate the synergy effects or 
for some other reason pays an excessive premium for the target, the acquisition will destroy 
value for the acquiring firm. If there are discrepancies between the management’s and the 
shareholder’s expectations of future performance, temporary misalignments in the share price 
may occur. The first issue is the most severe one as the value destruction will cause long term 
effects on performance whereas the misalignments between management and investors’ 
expectations will most likely be temporary.  
2.4 Information	  Hypothesis	  
The signalling theory suggests that the market is not fully efficient (Ross et al, 2003). As 
stressed earlier, the efficient market hypothesis suggests that in a semi-strong efficient market 
the stock price do reflect all publically available information (historical and current). 
However, in M&A deals the specific value enhancing factors are, in fact, unknown to the 
market. The implication is that managers and other insiders have access to certain information 
concerning the deal e.g. growth opportunities, operational and financial improvements etc., 
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
29	  
  
giving them an informational advantage over the market (Klein et al, 2002). This asymmetric 
information will force the market to assess other types or classes of information, and use these 
as proxies, in order to gain an as accurate view as possible of the true information content. 
Thus the market evaluates the statements and actions of the management, interpreting these as 
signals of confidence regarding future performance. (Culp, 2010) 
For example, if a company is undervalued, it can alter the capital structure by issuing debt. 
The announcement of increased leverage will send a positive signal to the market, since the 
market interprets the action as the management’s confidence about the future. (Van Horne & 
Wachowicz, 2008) Another example is whether a firm choose to increase its dividend levels. 
This signals a positive outlook for expected cash-flow. (Culp, 2010) However, poor quality in 
information may lead the market to misprice the events of corporate decision making (Klein 
et al, 2002, p.318). This creates an incentive for managers to communicate information to the 
market, as the success of the firm, thus that of the manager, is dependent upon the market 
value of the firm (Culp, 2010). 
 
A different approach to information asymmetry and its impact on a firm’s value is presented 
by Cheng, Li and Tong (2008)12. They examine (1) how information asymmetry affects the 
premium paid to public target firms and (2) how information asymmetry affects the 
announcement returns to the acquirer. Their findings suggest a higher premium paid for 
public targets with higher opacity (Cheng et al, 2008). The result thus shows a positive 
relationship between information asymmetry and abnormal returns for the acquirer. 
Apparently, the market reacts positively on acquisitions containing lesser information (Cheng 
et al, 2008). This suggests that the market is more likely to overprice than under-price when 
the information quality and quantity is poor.  
2.4.1 The	  theory’s	  relevance	  to	  the	  thesis	  
The information hypothesis has two important implications for this thesis. First, through the 
announcement of M&A’s the management reveals important information regarding their 
confidence of future performance. Given the credibility of the management and the quality of 
the information content the market can evaluate the signal. If the signal is interpreted as 
positive the market reaction should correspond accordingly. A negative signal should cause a 
reverse effect. However, the evidence of a positive relationship between information 
                                                            
12 Examining 1 612 publicly listed targets between 1985-2006 (Cheng et al, 2008). 
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asymmetry and positive abnormal returns indicates that less transparent targets would yield 
the acquiring firm a higher abnormal return.   
The second implication is that the management can signal information to the market even 
before an announcement. This can either be done through statements e.g. explicit M&A 
strategies or acquisition programs, or through actions such as recent M&A activity. These 
pre-announcement signals should reduce the probability of a surprise effect in the market, 
reducing abnormal returns.  
2.5 Differences	  between	  public	  and	  private	  targets	  
As previously discussed, several academic papers have studied acquisitions of public targets 
versus private targets. The main part of the literature suggests that the bidder, on average, 
receive zero or negative abnormal return when acquiring a public target, while a positive 
abnormal return when acquiring a private target firm. Why the market reacts differently has 
been explained in a number of academic studies (Koeplin, 2000; Chang, 1998; Moeller et al, 
2004; Kooli et al, 2003; Cheng et al, 2008 among others), where a range of factors are offered 
as possible explanations for the occurrence of positive market returns when acquiring a 
private firm. Recent research argues for a private firm discount (Koeplin et al, 2000) driven 
by factors such as lack of liquidity, lower bidding competition, information asymmetry among 
others, characteristics associated with private firms in general. Kooli, Kortas and L´Her 
(2003) show that private target firms are acquired at a median discount of 17% using sales-
ratio relative comparable publicly traded targets. Similarly, Koeplin, Sarin and Shapiro (2000) 
finds a discount of 20-30% using earnings multiple and Officier, Poulsen and Stegemoller 
(2008) show supporting evidence of 15-30% discount relative an acquisition multiple. It is 
further argued that the greater discount the more positive announcement return for the 
acquiring company, all else being equal. However, it is important to notice that the effect of 
the discount is driven by several factors. Despite previous research, the causes of the market 
reaction are not yet fully determined (Officier, 2008).  
2.5.1 Illiquidity	  
Capron and Shen (2007) state that illiquidity is the most prominent factor influencing the 
discount of private firms stocks. Damodaran (2003) explains that in controversial pricing 
models, the required rate return of an asset is a function of its risk exposure to the market. 
Such models however does not to take into account whether an asset is liquid or illiquid and 
consequently the rate will be the same for two companies bearing the same market risk. In 
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attempt to resolve the issue, more recent models include a liquidity premium which allows the 
rate of return to vary between firms with different amount of liquidity. Damodaran (2003) 
further state that since liquidity is correlated with current market conditions, illiquid stocks 
have more market risk and a premium should therefore be included to reflect the higher risk. 
This is supported by Acharya and Pedersen (2005) who state that an illiquid stock has a 
higher annualized risk premium of 1.1%, compared to liquid stocks on average, and 80% of 
this premium is due to the co-variance between the liquidity of the stock and the liquidity of 
the market. (Damodaran, 2003) Liquidity can be defined as the ability of an asset to be 
converted into cash quickly at a low, and a relatively predicable cost (Brealey et al, 2001 p. 
637). In a liquid stock market, public stocks are traded, with many buyers and sellers, at their 
intrinsic value (Koller et al, 2010 p. 252). In contrast, private stocks are not traded on open 
markets and are therefore referred to as illiquid. Such stocks are more difficult to buy and sell 
and the current value may not reflect the true value of stock. It is argued by Kooli, Kortas and 
L´Her (2003) that lack of liquidity is costly for investors as it reduces investor’s free cash-
flow and prevents them from efficiently allocate capital to other tradable assets (Kooli et al, 
2003). Furthermore, Pratt et al (2000) explain that an ownership in a company is worth more 
for an individual investor if it is marketable, i.e. easily can be converted into cash, in contrast 
to, less marketable ownerships (Pratt et al 2000, p. 416).  
Altogether this indicates that investors apply a discount to the overall value of a private firm.  
Taking this into consideration, public firms could create an implicit synergy based on 
liquidity when acquiring a private target. Put differently, the target firm’s value for a public 
acquirer is larger than it is for the private firm’s shareholders and thus there may be room for 
a larger value creation for the acquirer given that the premium is not increased by the same 
amount.  
2.5.2 Information	  asymmetry	  
It has been argued that a large difference between public and private firms is the information 
availability, both in terms of quantity and quality (Koeplin et al, 2000). Publicly traded firms, 
as actors on a stock exchange, has regulatory disclosure requirements to the public and also 
releases information through analysts and media. In contrast, private firms as non-traded firms 
are less transparent and can to some extent control its information disclosure. As discussed in 
section 2.4, the market tends to be over confident when assessing poor information, leading to 
an upward bias of the announcement effect (Cheng et al, 2008). This can explain the higher 
abnormal return for private targets compared to public targets (Cheng et al, 2008).  
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2.5.3 Payment	  
Whether a transaction is paid with cash or stock plays an important role in explaining the 
acquiring firms’ stock market return. As stressed earlier, the Signalling theory suggests that 
firms use its capital structure to signal future performance to the market due to information 
asymmetry. In line with the theory, if an acquirer uses stock as the payment when acquiring a 
public firm this indicates that the firm is overvalued. The market will therefore react 
negatively to the announcement. In contrast, if an acquirer uses cash to acquire a public target, 
the market may revaluate the target more positively, believing the acquirer to have more 
information than the market. (Culp, 2010)  
 
Chang (1998) examine the relationship between the payment method and market returns of 
public companies acquiring private targets. He suggests that the bidder receives no abnormal 
return in cash offers while a positive significant abnormal return in stock-swap offers. This is 
because, as the acquirer pay with stock and the target is owned by one or a few individuals, 
the target’s shareholders will form new block holders in the new entity resulting in increased 
control. (Chang, 1998; Cheng, 2008) 
2.5.4 Lower	  bidder	  competition	  
The market for corporate control of private and public companies differ in terms of 
competition, which has an effect of the announcement return. It is argued that the market for 
private firms is less competitive due to lack of transparency and information availability 
regarding the performance of potential targets. This will decrease the number of bidders and 
therefore the bidding competition. Lower competition will initially increase the bargaining 
power for the acquiring company relative the target. Increased power for the acquirer will 
then decrease the premium paid to the target and thus bidder will receive a larger part of the 
synergies. This will, all together, result in a positive abnormal return for the acquirer 
following the announcement. (Capron & Shen, 2007) In contrast, sales of publicly traded 
target firms are more auctions-like, often associated with bidding competitions. Potential 
buyers make bids, over the market value, with an intention to obtain the right of the target 
company (Varayia, 1988). This puts the target company in a bad bargaining position relative 
the bidder. And, as stressed earlier, a higher premium paid will result in a negative 
announcement return. (Capron & Shen, 2007) 
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3 METHODOLOGY	  
The chapter is introduced with a thorough walk-through of the Event study methodology. This 
is followed by a section on the statistical test procedures before constructing the regression 
models. Lastly the validity and reliability of the thesis is addressed.  
3.1 Research	  approach	  	  
Based on the purpose of this paper a deductive approach is used where existing theory guides 
the authors when formulating hypotheses, which then are tested empirically through 
quantitative data analysis.  
3.2 Event	  Study	  
The event study method is the standard approach when measuring the effect of an event, such 
as an acquisition, and it aims to separate company specific events from market or industry 
specific events (Benninga, 2008).  
Daily stock returns surrounding the event are compared to an estimated normal or expected 
return and the difference is the effect of the event, also referred to as the abnormal return. The 
statistical method assumes rational investors and an efficient market, why the effect of an 
event is expected to appear immediately in the stock price (MacKinlay, 1997). Given an 
efficient market it is thus possible to detect value creation or destruction from M&A activity.  
Ahern (2009) states that one of the most important features of the Event Study methodology 
is that the time specific prediction error over time is reduced to zero as the sample size is 
increased. 
MacKinlay (1997) divides the event study methodology into the following seven steps: 
3.2.1 Definition	  of	  event	  and	  timeframe	  
The event is in this paper defined as the announcement of a merger or acquisition and the 
announcement day, also called event day, is set to 𝑇!. To capture possible insider trading or 
information leakages the event window is often set to start a few days before the event day 
(Benninga, 2008). Delayed effects, due to weaker market efficiency, can also be measured by 
extending the event window to a few days after the event day (Arnold, 2008). Extending the 
event window is however problematic for two reasons, where the first is an increased risk of 
capturing other company specific events which could bias the measurement of abnormal 
returns (Tuch & O’Sullivan, 2007). The other potential problem is that, as the event window 
is extended, the risk for clustering increases. That is; the returns used to calculate abnormal 
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returns may be correlated cross-sectionally, causing biased estimations of the standard errors, 
which can lead to incorrect inference (Bernard, 1987). When the event windows of several 
different observations overlap in time the problem is considerable, especially in studies where 
events occur at the same point in time (e.g. reactions to releases of accounting data or 
regulatory changes affecting several firms), but it can also be present in other types of event 
studies (Bernard, 1987). These problems are mitigated by the usage of a small event window 
while also controlling the sample of cross-sectional events for clustering around specific time 
periods. The event window is thus set to start two days before the event day (𝑇!!) and to 
finish three days after the event day (𝑇!!). There is no clustering of events in the sample. 
3.2.2 Data	  set	  
3.2.2.1 Data	  Collection	  
The data is gathered from secondary data sources; the data is originally collected and/or 
measured by other institutions for other purposes than this paper. This increases the risk for 
measurement errors why only reliable sources has been used. Databases used are:  
• Thomson Reuters Eikon, where cross-sectional M&A data as well as characteristic 
regarding the announcement have been collected for Scandinavian listed firms. (The 
sample selection process and delimitations are presented in section 3.2.2.2)  
• Thomson Reuters DataStream Advanced, where time series data consisting of daily 
share prices, market cap for each cross-sectional unit as well as indices has been 
collected. Daily data observations are used because it increases the power of the 
statistical tests. (MacKinlay, 1997)  
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3.2.2.2 Data	  sample	  
Table 3.1: Delimitations and loss of data  
 
Source: created by the Authors 
 
Table 3.1 illustrates the sampling process which is divided into two stages, delimitations and 
data quality, where the first selection of data is made through criteria set in Eikon. The criteria 
is set for practical reasons but also motivated by theory. The total population of M&A 
announcements reported by Eikon is 905 338. The sample is reduced to 44 804 observations 
by setting the time period between 1-jan-2004 to 1-jan-2014 which also allows for an 
inclusion of a complete economic cycle. M&A activity by firms listed on stock exchanges in 
Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark is included which totals to 17 788 announcements. In 
order to measure the impact on a firm’s value only publicly listed acquirers are included 
which reduces the sample to 6 022. Acquisition announcements of both listed (public) and 
non-listed (private) targets are included which further limits the observations to 4 114. The 
deal must be for more than 50% of the targets share or assets and furthermore the deal size 
must be equal to, or more than, $10M. The size of the deal is important since small 
acquisitions (both in nominal amount and in relative measures) tend to have less impact on 
the acquiring firm (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989a). The sample thus includes 501 observations. 
Bidders and targets from the industries financial, bank, insurance, credit institutions, 
alternative financial investments, diversified financials and brokerage were excluded from the 
sample since these firms belong to a different sector of the economy while also having 
different regulations and accounting principles, essentially making them harder to correctly 
value (Koller et al, 2010 p. 765). The total sample gathered from Eikon consists of 455 
announcements where 99 are for public targets and 356 are for private targets.  
Private
(target
All#Announcements Reported(in(Eikon 905338
Announcement#Date (1.jan.2004(to(1.jan.2014 44804
Acquirer#Nation# Sweden,(Norway,(Finland(and(Denmark 17788
Acquirer#Public#Status Public 6022
Target#Public#Status Public(or(Private 947 3167 4114
Percentage#Acquired# >50% 2148
Deal#Size (≥$10M 501
Acquirer?#and#Target#industry All(except(Banks,(Financials(and(Insurance 99 356 455
Criteria(for(data(quality(set(by( Private
the(authors target
Data#availability# Reported(in(Datastream 80 97 177
Control#for#clustering Event(Window(does(not(overlap 78 97 175
Control#for#extreme#values Values(within(5(.(95(percentile 64 87 157
Criteria Public(target Total
Number(of(observations
Criteria(for(delimitation(set(in(Eikon Criteria Public(target Total
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The second stage of the sample selection is determined by the availability and quality of data. 
The first criterion is that only announced deals where all data is available in Datastream is 
included. Many companies were listed within a year to the announcement limiting the 
estimation of normal returns, which is further explained in section 3.2.3. As a consequence 
these observations are excluded from the sample. Additionally, when controlling for 
clustering, two observations were removed due to two announced acquisitions by the same 
company on the same day. Furthermore the data sample is trimmed for extreme values for 
every series of data variables that has problem with normality caused by outliers (this is 
explained in detail in section 3.3).  
3.2.3 Model	  for	  estimation	  of	  normal	  returns	  
In order to measure the exogenous effect of an announcement on a firm’s performance, an 
expected return must be calculated and compared to the actual return.   
There are several different models to calculate the normal, or expected, returns. The models 
can be categorized as statistical and economic models, where the former are derived from 
statistical assumptions regarding the behaviour of asset returns while the latter, in addition to 
statistical assumptions, also includes economic restrictions based on economic arguments 
concerning investor behaviour (MacKinlay, 1997). Among the economic models the most 
common ones used for estimating normal returns are the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). The economic models should theoretically 
have a greater potential of calculating more precise estimates of normal returns (MacKinlay, 
1997). However, deviations from the models have been discovered (Fama & French, 1996) 
implying that the validity of the restrictions imposed by CAPM on the market model is 
questionable, since the results may be sensitive to the specific restrictions (MacKinlay, 1997). 
The statistical models are in contrast viewed as more flexible and includes the Constant mean 
return model, the Market model as well as Multi-factor models (MacKinlay, 1997). The 
underlying assumptions of the models are that the asset returns are jointly multivariate normal 
and independently and identically distributed through time. These criteria must be fulfilled in 
order for the models to be correctly specified. Corrections for this potential problem with 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity can be made by using generalized method-of-moments 
approach. (MacKinlay, 1997)  
Among the statistical models the most common ones are the market model and the constant 
mean return-model. The market model is an ordinary least square (OLS) regression of the 
individual stock return in relation to a market index with the daily returns as an independent 
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variable and the stocks beta value as explanatory variable. Common criteria for choosing 
market indexes are that the index should either be a broad-based value-weighted index or a 
float-weighted index (Benninga, 2008). 
An early argument against the market model is that it assumes a constant Beta value for every 
company over the given estimation window, which may not be a reasonable argument 
(Dimson, 1979). However, while being a simple model it stands strong against more 
sophisticated models when tested empirically (MacKinlay, 1997; Ahern, 2009). The multi-
factor models adds additional explanatory variables to the market model regression and 
potentially increases the explanatory power (𝑅!), thus further reducing the variance of the 
abnormal returns. However empirical results (Ahern, 2009) indicates that the gains of using 
multi-factor models are generally limited because the marginal effect of introducing 
additional variables is small. Multi-factor models works best when the sample got common 
features, e.g. all firms are from the same industry. (MacKinlay, 1997) Since the sample used 
in this paper does not share the common features mentioned by MacKinlay (1997) the market 
model is assumed to provide good enough estimates why it is chosen as the model for 
estimation of normal returns. The calculations are performed in EViews with control for 
normality and autocorrelation, which is not a problem in the sample. Corrections are made for 
possible heteroskadicity by using the approach of White (1980). The equation is (MacKinlay, 
1997):  
 𝐸𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽!×𝑅!" + 𝜀!" 
 Equation  1.  The  Market  Model  
Where:  
 𝐸𝑅!" = Expected  return  for  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ 
 𝛼! = Alfavalue  (constant)  for  stock  𝑖   
 𝛽! = Systematic  risk, betavalue  for  stock  𝑖13  𝑅!" = The  market  return  on  day  τ  𝜀!" = Zero  mean  disturbance  term  in  the  model  on  day  τ   
 
To apply the market model the returns of the stock and the market index needs to be 
calculated, for each cross-sectional unit and for each day of the estimation window.  
 
                                                            
13 Beta is the stocks sensitivity to changes in the market portfolios return and specifies the slope in a linear regression 
(Benninga, 2008).  
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Daily stock returns are calculated according to the following formula:  
 𝑅!" = 𝑃!" − 𝑃!"!!𝑃!"!!  
 Equation  2.  Daily  return  for  an  individual  stock  
Where: 𝑅!" = Return  of  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ 𝑃!" = Closing  price  of  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ 𝑃!"!! = Closing  price  of  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ − 1     
 
Daily returns on the index are calculated with the formula below: 
 𝑅!"#$%!" = 𝑃!"#$%!" − 𝑃!"#$%!"!!𝑃!"#$%!"!!  
 Equation  3.  Daily  return  on  the  market  index  
Where: 𝑅!"#$%!" = Return  of  index  𝑖  on  day  τ 𝑃!"#$%!" = Closing  price  for  index  𝑖  on  day  τ 𝑃!"#$%!"!! = Closing  price  for  index  𝑖  on  day  τ − 1        
The beta coefficient is calculated with the formula below: 
 𝛽! = 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑅!",𝑅!"#$%!"𝜎!!"#$%!"  
 Equation  4.  Beta  value  for  an  individual  stock    
Where: 𝐶𝑜𝑣 𝑅!",𝑅!"#$%!" = Covvariance  between  the  return  on  the  stock  𝑖  and  the  Index  𝑖  on  day  τ   𝜎!!"#$%!" = Variance  for  the  Index  𝑖  on  day  τ     
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The alfa value is calculated according to the formula below:  
 𝛼! = 𝑅!" − 𝛽! ∗ 𝑅!"#$%!" 
 Equation  5.  Alfa  value  for  an  individual  stock  
 
The indices chosen for the calculations above are based on the best fit for each individual 
stock. Since the stocks in the sample are listed on different exchanges and in different caps, 
the value-weighted price index consisting of all listed shares for each market is used. The 
stocks are matched with the index of the market they are or were listed on. The following 
indices are used: 
• Index for Sweden: OMX Stockholm (OMXS) PI, Nasdaq OMX 
• Index for Norway: FTSE W NORWAY, PI, FTSE 
• Index for Finland: OMX Helsinki (OMXH) PI, Nasdaq OMX  
• Index for Denmark:  OMX Copenhagen (OMXC) PI, Nasdaq OMX  
 
3.2.4 Determining	  the	  estimation	  window	  
The estimation window is used to calculate the normal or expected returns of a stock. There 
should not be any overlap of the estimation window and the event window since it could bias 
the estimation of normal returns. The length of the estimation window is normally 252 trading 
days, a year, and should not be less than 126 trading days for inference to be valid. The 
benefit of using a year is that seasonal variation is less likely to bias the results. (Benninga, 
2008) The choice of estimation window and event window can be seen in figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: The range of the Event Study 
 
 
Source: created by the Authors 
Estimation window 
252 trading days 
Event window 
6 Trading days 
T0 T+3 T-2 
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3.2.5 Calculating	  abnormal	  returns	  
When calculating the abnormal return the expected return is subtracted from the actual return. 
The abnormal return is the estimated effect of the event that cannot be explained by the 
markets general development (MacKinlay, 1997).  
  𝐴𝑅!" = 𝑅!" −   𝐸𝑅!" 
 Equation  6.  Abnormal  return  for  an  individual  stock  
Where: 𝐴𝑅!" = The  abnormal  return  of  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ 𝑅!" = Actual  return  of  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ 𝐸𝑅!" = The  expected  return  of  stock  𝑖  on  day  τ 
 
3.2.6 Aggregating	  abnormal	  returns	  
The average abnormal return is calculated for every day where N is the number of cross-
sectional units (MacKinlay, 1997).  
  
𝐴𝐴𝑅! = 1𝑁 𝐴𝑅!"!!!!  
 Equation  7.  Average  abnormal  return  
 
The cumulative abnormal return, CAR, for every cross-sectional unit over the event window 
is then calculated (MacKinlay, 1997):  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅!(!!,!!) = 𝐴𝑅!"!!!!!!  
 Equation  8.  Cumulative  abnormal  return  for  the  individual  stock  
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To make general conclusions of the events effect on stocks performance on average, the 
cumulative average abnormal return, CAAR, is calculated:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(!!,!!) = 1𝑁 𝐴𝑅!!!!!  
 Equation  9.  Cumulative  average  abnormal  return    
3.2.7 Interpretations	  and	  Conclusions	  
When AAR, CAR and CAAR are calculated, hypotheses can be formulated and tested to 
statistically verify the significance of the results (MacKinlay, 1997). 
3.3 Statistical	  tests	  	  
Statistical tests needs to be conducted in order to draw general conclusions about the 
population based on the results of the sample. There are several different methods of testing 
whether the abnormal returns (AR) surrounding the M&A announcement is statistically 
significant, where two broad categories are parametric and non-parametric tests. The 
parametric tests have stricter underlying assumptions but are also considered as stronger tests 
given that the assumptions are met (Westerlund, 2005). The most important assumption is that 
the sample follows a normal distribution, which is why a normality test is conducted for the 
cross- sectional average abnormal returns (AAR) for each day over the event window as well 
as for the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR), (see Appendix 9). Before the 
normality test is performed the series are controlled for extreme values, which if they occur 
are very likely to distort any normality (Brooks, 2010).  
To check for extreme values 𝐴𝑅! and CAR for every cross-sectional unit is examined using 
boxplot diagrams (one for each day over the event window) where values outside 1.5 times 
the interquartile range above(below) the upper(lower) quartile is defined as outliers (Körner & 
Wahlgren, 2010). To deal with the non-normality caused by outliers one can either exclude 
observations (trimming) or transform the extreme data points (winsorising). However, every 
point of data represents a useful piece of information why the removal or transformation of 
data should be motivated by rational theoretical arguments. In the sample, the observed 
outliers are firms which had a very high abnormal return. When examining the observations 
closer it turns out that these firms all represent pharmaceutical and oil or ore prospecting 
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
42	  
  
companies, which could be argued to represent another population of firms since their 
business model differ a lot from most regular companies. Thus removing the outliers from the 
sample should be the better way to go about the problem. The exclusion of outliers is done in 
EViews where observations below the fifth percentile and above the ninety-fifth percentile are 
removed for 𝐴𝑅! and CAR.   
The chosen significance test is the Students t-test (Westerlund, 2005) with which the 
abnormal returns (AR) for the entire sample as well as for the divided samples of Public and 
Private targets is tested for each day over the event window. The CAR over the event window 
is also tested. The hypotheses which are tested are stated as follows: 
 
(I) Testing the Total sample 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there are no abnormal returns. (𝐴𝐴𝑅! = 0) 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there are abnormal returns. (𝐴𝐴𝑅! ≠ 0) 
 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is 
abnormal no return. (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(!!!  …  !!!) = 0) 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is 
abnormal return. (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(!!!  …  !!!) ≠ 0) 
 
 
(II) Testing the Acquirers of Public target sample 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there are no abnormal returns for firms 
acquiring Public targets. (𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,! = 0) 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there are abnormal returns for firms 
acquiring Public targets. (𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,! ≠ 0) 
 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is no 
abnormal return for firms acquiring Public targets.  (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) = 0) 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is 
abnormal return for firms acquiring Public targets.  (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$!"  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) ≠ 0) 
 
 
(III) Testing the Acquirers of Private target sample 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there are no abnormal returns for firms 
acquiring Private targets. (𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,! = 0) 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there are abnormal returns for firms 
acquiring Private targets. (𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,! ≠ 0) 
 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is no 
abnormal return for firms acquiring Private targets. 
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(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) = 0) 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is 
abnormal return for firms acquiring Private targets.  (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!, !!!  …  !!! ≠ 0) 
 
 
(IV) Testing the Acquirers of Public versus Private target sample 𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there is no difference in abnormal returns 
between firms acquiring Public targets compared to firms acquiring Private targets. 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,! = 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,!  𝐻!:  On day t surrounding an M&A announcement there is a difference in abnormal returns 
between firms acquiring Public targets compared to firms acquiring Private targets. (𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,! ≠ 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,!) 
 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is no 
difference in abnormal returns between firms acquiring Public targets compared to firms 
acquiring Private targets. (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) = 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!)) 𝐻!:  Over the event window (t-2 … t+3) surrounding an M&A announcement there is a 
difference in abnormal returns between firms acquiring Public targets compared to firms 
acquiring Private targets.  (𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) ≠ 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!)) 
 
Table 3.2: Summary of Hypotheses 
Total	  
Sample	  
 
𝐻! 𝐻! 𝐴𝐴𝑅! = 0 𝐴𝐴𝑅! ≠ 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 !!!  …  !!! = 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(!!!  …  !!!) ≠ 0 
Acquiring	  
Public	  
Targets	  
 
𝐻! 𝐻! 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,! = 0 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,! ≠ 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) = 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) ≠ 0 
Acquiring	  
Private	  
Targets	  
	  
𝐻! 𝐻! 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !!"#$%&  !"#$%!,! = 0 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,! ≠ 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!, !!!  …  !!! = 0 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!, !!!  …  !!! ≠ 0 
Acquiring	  
Public	  
Targets	  
Vs.	  
Private	  
Targets	  
	  
𝐻! 
 𝐻! 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,!= 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,! 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,!≠ 𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,!  
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!)= 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!)≠ 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅!"#$%&%'(  !"#$%&'  !"#$%!,(!!!  …  !!!) 
Source: created by the Authors 
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3.3.1	  Multiple	  linear	  regression	  	  
In order to answer the second research question multiple linear regression analysis will be 
conducted. The general regression model used to explain abnormal returns can be seen below 
(MacKinlay, 1997):    
 𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑥!! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!" + 𝜀! 
 Equation  10.  Multiple  linear  regression  model  
Where: 
 𝐴𝑅! = The  𝑖!!  abnormal  return  observation 
 𝑥!" ,𝑚 = 1,… ,𝑁, are  𝑁  characteristics  for  the  𝑖!!  observation 
 𝛽!,𝑛 = 0,… ,𝑁, are  regression  coefficients 
 𝜀! = The  zero  mean  disturbance  term 
3.3.1.1 Explanatory	  variables	  	  
The authors choose to include variables which have been found significant in previous 
research and that are motivated by theory. The inclusion of variables is however limited to the 
availability of data. This could create a problem if omitted variables are correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Then one of the OLS assumptions would be violated causing biased 
and inconsistent coefficient estimations (see section 3.3.1.2 for further elaboration). Even 
when omitted variables are not correlated with the explanatory variables, the constant term 
and error terms could be biased making inference wrong. On the other hand including 
irrelevant variables leads to inefficiency due to loss of degrees of freedom in the inference. 
(Brooks, 2008) It is basically a trade-off between the goodness of fit and the strength of the 
model.  
The variables included in the models are presented as follows:  
 
Relative size 
It is argued that the relative size of the target is (1) positively correlated with acquirers CAAR 
and (2) have a substantial influence on acquirers AAR (Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989); Misra & 
Gupta, 2007; Fuller et al, 2002). Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) measures the variable as the 
market value of equity for the target firm divided by the market value of equity for the 
bidding company three month prior to the announcement. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002) estimates the relative size as the value of the target (undisclosed measurement method) 
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divided by the market value of the acquiring firm, calculated as the monthly share price times 
shares outstanding one month prior to the deal announcement.    
For this thesis the relative size is measured in accordance with Misra and Gupta (2007):  
 $𝐵𝑖𝑑!!! $𝑀𝑉𝐴!" Equation  11.  Relative  Size  of  the  target  to  acquirer  
 
Where:  $𝐵𝑖𝑑!!! = The initial bid price (deal size) for the target firm at 𝑇! (the announcement day) $𝑀𝑉𝐴!" = The acquiring firm’s average market value between 𝑇!!" and 𝑇!! (15 trading days, or three weeks). 
 
The reason for using the initial bid price instead of the market value of the targets equity is 
simply because private targets by definition do not have a market value of equity. One major 
difference when using the bid price instead of market values prior to the bid is that the relative 
size measure will include the premium offered to the target’s shareholders. In effect, a 
positive relation between abnormal returns and relative size would imply that the expected 
synergies exceed the premium offered.   
 
Deal size 
It is shown that the deal size has a significant impact on the abnormal returns surrounding an 
M&A announcement (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004; Fuller et al, 2011; Loderer & Martin, 
1990; and Gordon et al, 2009).  
The deal size is simply measured as the initial bid price for the target firm at 𝑇!  (the 
announcement day): $𝐵𝑖𝑑!!! 
 
Serial acquirer 
Previous research (Fuller et al, 2002; Capron & Shen, 2007) found that the markets perception 
of previous M&A activity will serve as a reference for future acquisitions. Based on the 
assumption of EMH; that the stock price reaction following the announcement only reflects 
new information released to the market, firms with history of M&A activity will only 
experience abnormal returns when the actual announcement differs from the anticipated one. 
Thus firms that has previous experience with M&A is expected to have a smaller market 
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reaction on average, compared to firms with no previous M&A activity where the market 
should not anticipate the announcement and therefore be surprised to a larger extent. 
There are several approaches in order to capture this effect. Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002) classified a frequent acquirer as a firm that had acquired five or more targets over the 
past three years. Capron and Shen (2007) on the other hand create a variable by using the total 
number of transactions five years prior to the bid.  
After investigating the sample specifically collected for the aim of the thesis, the authors can 
confirm that firms do make multiple acquisitions (see Appendix 10) and the Serial Acquirer 
variable is measured as a proxy for acquiring experience.  
 
For this thesis a Serial acquirer is defined as a company who over a three year period, prior to 
the bid, has acquired three or more targets. The variable is constructed as a dummy variable 
with value 1 if the bidder is a serial acquirer and 0 if not.  
 
Important to notice is that the variable only takes large acquisitions into account when in fact 
some firms may have a lot of experience based on small acquisitions, which here is ignored.  
Furthermore, since the variable is based on a quantitative measurement with a rough 
classification. Chances are that explicitly expressed acquisition programmes or qualitative 
elements of implicit information found in press releases or annual reports could serve as more 
useful in determining acquirer experience. Altogether the simplified approximation increases 
the risk for measurement error, where the proxy fails to capture what is intended. 
 
Implied Premium 
The Implied Premium is measured according to Misra and Gupta (2007) with an addition of 
correction for the percentage bid since this thesis includes bids in a range of 50% to 100% of 
target shares or assets.  
 $𝐵𝑖𝑑!!! (%𝐵𝑖𝑑!!!×$𝑀𝑉𝑇!") 
 Equation  12.  Implied  Premium  
Where:  $𝐵𝑖𝑑!!! = The initial bid price (deal size) for the target company i on the announcement day. %𝐵𝑖𝑑!!!= The initial bid percentage for the shares or assets of target company i on the announcement day.  $𝑀𝑉𝑇! = The target firm’s average market value between 𝑇!!" and 𝑇!! (15 trading days, or three weeks). 
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Form 
Previous research found that differences in abnormal returns could be explained by the form 
of the transaction, where acquisitions of stocks gave more positive returns compared to 
acquisitions of certain assets. (Bieshaar et al, 2001) 
 
The Form variable is constructed as a dummy with value 1 for acquisition of shares and 0 for 
acquisition of assets.  
 
Target Public Status (TPS) 
The findings of a private firm discount (Fuller et al, 2002; Capron & Shen, 2007) motivate the 
authors to further analyse if the effect on abnormal returns can be described by the 
classification of the target public status.   
 
The TPS variable is constructed as a dummy with values of 1 for publicly listed targets and 0 
for privately held targets. 
 
When dividing private and public targets into different groups it can serve as a proxy for 
illiquidity and information asymmetry as these aspects could be assumed to be captured in the 
variable. The other theoretical explanatory factors such as payment and bidder-competition 
are however not captured and these effects must be measured and tested by other methods. 
This sample of Scandinavian mergers and acquisitions are to the vast majority consisting of 
cash payments. The observations of stock payments are too few to draw statistical inference 
from, which is why this component is assumed to not influence any effect of the private firm 
discount. A possible explanation for the absence of stock bids is that this paper focuses on 
large deals, which are found to be paid in cash more often than with stocks (Hansen, 1987).   
The bidder-competition is a variable that has not been measured in this study, due to 
limitations in data availability, which is why it cannot be argued whether it has an impact or 
not.  
3.3.1.2	  The	  model	  specification	  &	  assumptions	  
The announcement effect is assumed to be captured over the event window, but the largest 
influence is expected on the announcement day which is why both AR(T) and CAR will be 
tested as the dependent variable. In order to examine whether the variables have different 
impacts on abnormal returns associated with the target public status, the models will be run 
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for the total sample, the public target sample and the private target sample respectively. To 
specify the models correctly numerous assumptions must be met, i.e. the data must fulfil 
certain criteria and the right model must be chosen for the results to be stable and unbiased.  
First correlation matrixes are constructed with the dependent and independent variables to 
ensure that the explanatory variables are not highly correlated with each other, which would 
indicate a multicollinearity problem. This problem would make the fit of the model, 𝑅!, 
artificially high while the individual parameters would be insignificant due to large standard 
errors. The model would also be more sensitive to the specification, i.e. inclusion and 
exclusion of explanatory variables. The overall precision of the model would therefore be low 
(Brooks, 2008). As can be seen in Appendix 7, the overall correlation between the 
independent variables is low for the different models why all variables can be included so far.  
The Deal Size and Relative Size variables are logged to even out the skewed distribution.  
The multiple linear regression models are specified as follows:  
 𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝐷)!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!!+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟(𝐷)!! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑃𝑆(𝐷)!! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  13.  OLS  model  (I),  AR(T),  total  sample  
 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝐷)!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!!+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟(𝐷)!! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑃𝑆(𝐷)!! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  14.  OLS  model  (II),  CAR,  total  sample      𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!!+ 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐷 !! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  15.  OLS  model  (III),  AR(T)  (1),  Public  target  sample  
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𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚!! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  16.  OLS  model  (IV),  AR(T)  (2),  Public  target  sample      𝐶𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!!+ 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚 𝐷 !! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  17.  OLS  model  (V),  CAR  (1),  Public  target  sample      𝐶𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚!! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  18.  OLS  model  (VI),  CAR  (2),  Public  target  sample      𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝐷)!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!!+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟(𝐷)!! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  19.  OLS  model  (VII),  AR(T),  Private  target  sample      𝐶𝐴𝑅! = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚(𝐷)!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!!+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟(𝐷)!! + 𝜀! 
 Equation  20.  OLS  model  (VIII),  CAR,  Private  target  sample  
 
As mentioned, the underlying assumptions for the OLS must be fulfilled in order to have an 
appropriate model with stable and unbiased parameters.  
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OLS assumptions (Brooks, 2008): 1   𝐸 𝑢! = 0   2   𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑢! = 𝜎! < ∞  3   𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑢! ,𝑢! = 0  4   𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝑢! , 𝑥! = 0  5   𝑢!~𝑁(0,𝜎!) 
 
The first (1) assumption is that the expected value of the error terms is zero, which will be 
fulfilled when a constant term is included in the model.  
The second (2) assumption is that the error terms are homoscedastic, that is; the variance of 
the error terms is constant over the entire sample. If the assumption does not hold and the 
errors are in fact heteroscedastic, the inference could be misleading (Brooks, 2008). Using 
Whites’ approach (White, 1980) potential heteroskedasticity is corrected for.  
The third (3) assumption is that the errors are uncorrelated with each other. Since the data is 
controlled for clustering, which is the most probable cause of correlated errors in cross-
sectional data (Bernard, 1987), the assumption is that there is no serial correlation.  
Assumption four (4) requires the regressors to not be correlated with the error terms, i.e. 𝜀! are 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the x’s. If this assumption is violated an endogeneity 
problem arises and the OLS estimators will be inconsistent. When interpreting the results of 
the regression models the issue of selection bias must be addressed. Technically a selection 
bias is introduced when there exists a relation between unobserved firm characteristics and 
anticipation of an event (MacKinlay, 1997). This problem may however be less serious given 
weak correlation between explanatory variables and the dependent variable, where inference 
on the biased estimators could be interpreted as lower bunds of the true estimator values 
(MacKinlay, 1997). For this thesis, the independent variables do have a weak correlation with 
the dependent variable which could mitigate the selection bias. However other types of 
endogeneity, such as omitted variable bias, may be present.  
The fifth (5) assumption is that the error terms follow a normal distribution, which is an 
important underlying assumption for the hypothesis tests of the model parameters (Brooks, 
2008). When examining the normality assumption with a Jarque-Berra test performed in 
EViews, all models pass the test for normality except for model I (see Appendix 8). However 
the Jarqye-Berra test is quite strong and the models can be assumed to be approximately 
normally distributed according to the central limit theorem (Westerlund, 2005). MacKinlay 
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
51	  
  
(1997) states that the convergence to the asymptotic distribution happens for quite small 
samples in event studies. 
3.4 Reliability	  &	  Validity	  	  
The term validity refers to the absence of systematic errors, and can be categorized as internal 
and external validity (Bryman & Bell, 2005). Internal validity is achieved if the method 
measures the effect it is intended to measure. When using an event study the internal validity 
is always problematic since: (1) the assumption of an exogenous event would be violated if 
any other effect is captured in the event window. The use of a short event window mitigates 
the risk for unwanted external influence, and as the sample size increases the smaller the 
impact of sporadic undesired events. (2) the measurement of normal returns will arguably 
provide less than perfect estimations. The market model will however, as previously 
discussed, stand strong against more sophisticated approaches. (MacKinlay, 1997) 
Overall the loss of data is problematic as it could cause biases in the sample (Westerlund, 
2005). Specifically the study fails to include acquisitions made by firms which recently have 
been listed. The occurrence of such acquisitions seems to be frequently represented in the 
population and the authors are aware of that the failure to measure those deals may distort the 
results. However the exclusion of certain data is necessary in order to conduct the research.   
The variables used for determining the influence of certain deal characteristics on abnormal 
returns will also challenge the internal validity of the study. When estimating the relative size, 
the approach uses the bid price at the announcement day as a proxy for the target’s market 
value. A potential problem arises since the bid price also includes the premium. As an 
increase in premium is found to have a negative impact whereas the relative size on the 
contrary has a positive relation with abnormal returns, the proxy may underestimate the real 
relation of the relative size. The reason for using bid prices as proxies for target value is, as 
stated above, because the actual market price is not present for privately held companies.  
Also the estimation of the variable serial acquirer is problematic, as stated before, since the 
simplified approximation increases the risk for measurement error, where the proxy fails to 
capture what is intended. However, a similar approach for variable estimation has been used 
in previous research.  
The external validity for this thesis concern the qualification and eligibility of the method 
used, i.e. if the chosen models represent an appropriate method regarding the ability to answer 
the research questions (Bryman & Bell, 2005). The event study is the most commonly used 
method when addressing the announcement effect and the authors have followed the 
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suggested steps of MacKinlay (1997). The statistical tests are done in accordance to 
Westerlund (2005) and Körner Wahlgren (2006) where a large emphasis is put on the model 
assumptions. The regression models used is based on the suggested steps of Brooks (2008), 
however the models have not been controlled for endogeneity which is somewhat of a 
concern.     
In terms of reliability, which is defined as the absence of random and systematic measurement 
errors (Bryman & Bell, 2005), the sampling process as well as the calculations is conducted 
using programmes, such as Datastream, Eikon, MS excel and EViews. Being a requirement 
for validity the reliability is further established by exercising standardized approaches for data 
preparation through usage of templates in accordance with Benninga (2008). The authors 
have also performed regular spot-checks where the data has been cross checked for errors, 
why the reliability is assumed to be strong, although the absence of random measurement 
errors can never be guaranteed.  
Literary sources have mainly been collected from LUBsearch, the Lund University Library 
search engine. All theoretical and empirical sources are either published in reputable 
academic journals or published course literature. The articles have thus been reviewed before 
publishing which ensure their credibility. When referring to previous academic work the 
authors have tried to maintain an objective view, with reservation for possible 
misinterpretations.   
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4 RESULTS	  AND	  ANALYSIS	  
In this chapter the empirical findings will be presented, followed by analysis of the results in 
regards to previous presented research and theory.  
4.1 Announcement	  effects	  
Table 4.1: Output from T-tests   
 
 significant at 10 % level 
* significant at 5 % level 
** significant at 1 % level 
*** significant at 0,1 % level 
Source: created by the Authors 
 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the mean values (AAR) for the total sample are positive for all 
days across the event window except for (T+2), where they are slightly negative but not 
significantly different from zero. The total sample has an average abnormal return (AAR) 
significantly different from zero on the event day (T) and the following day (T+1) as well as 
significant cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over the entire event window. The 
Hₒ μ=0 μ=0 μ=0
Observations 157 70 87 70;)87
AR0(T32) Mean 0,014% 0,112% 0,199% 0,112%;)0,199%
Variance 0,012% 0,013% 0,018% 0,012%;)0,013%
t3stat 0,156 0,822 1,363 10,436
P 0,876 0,414 0,176 0,663
AR0(T31) Mean 0,158% 10,058% 0,064% 10,058%;)0,064%
Variance 0,016% 0,009% 0,015% 0,009%;)0,015%
t3stat 1,573 10,521 0,481 10,703
P 0,118 0,604 0,632 0,483
AR0(T) Mean 0,946% 0,490% 1,317% 0,490%;)1,317%
Variance 0,071% 0,065% 0,075% 0,065%;)0,075%
t3stat 4,44 1,603 4,473 11,948
P 0,000 *** 0,113 0,000 *** 0,053
AR0(T+1) Mean 0,356% 0,346% 0,364% 0,346%;)0,364%
Variance 0,029% 0,031% 0,028% 0,031%,)0,028%
t3stat 2,622 1,643 2,045 10,063
P 0,010 ** 0,105 0,044 * 0,950
AR0(T+2) Mean 10,010% 10,018% 10,015% 10,018%;)10,015%
Variance 0,018% 0,018% 0,018% 0,018%;)0,018%
t3stat 10,095 10,114 10,104 10,014
P 0,924 0,909 0,917 0,989
AR0(T+3) Mean 0,037% 10,238% 0,267% 10,238%;)0,267%
Variance 0,020% 0,022% 0,020% 0,022%;)0,020%
t3stat 0,327 11,351 1,751 12,168
P 0,744 0,181 0,084 0,032 *
CAR Mean 1,828% 0,931% 2,678% 0,931%;)2,678%
Variance 0,211% 0,183% 0,252% 0,183%;)0,252%
t3stat 4,990 1,820 4,973 12,352
P 0,000 *** 0,073 0,000 *** 0,020 *
Private0targets Public0versus0Private
μ)public)1)μ)private=0
Total0sample Public0targets
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average abnormal return on the event day (AAR (T)) and on the following day (AAR (T+1)) 
is close to 1 % and 0.35 % respectively, while the other days have much lower abnormal 
returns, close to zero on average. The variance is also higher on the announcement day (T) 
and the following day (T+1) indicating a larger spread of returns in the sample. Figure 4.1 
illustrates the AAR and CAAR over the event window for the total sample. The market 
reaction is limited to the event day and the following day which corresponds to the 
implications of strong or semi-strong market efficiency. The effect on the following day 
(T+1) could be due to the problem of estimating the exact time of the announcement. If the 
announcement is reported on day (T) but the news reaches the market after closing, the actual 
effect would be seen in (T+1). The implication of market efficiency is that the abnormal 
returns reflect the specific event as all other information already is assumed to be incorporated 
in the stock price. Thus only new information that changes the pre-existing market 
expectations will cause abnormal returns following an announcement. The existence of 
abnormal returns following the announcements in the sample suggests that the market on 
average is surprised when an M&A offer is publicly announced, which is supported by both 
EMH and the information hypothesis.  
 
Figure 4.1: Abnormal returns – the Total Sample 
 
The average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) for each day over the event window for the 
total sample.  
Source: created by the Authors 
 
The average positive announcement return for acquirers in this sample is a conflicting result 
to previous empirical findings such as (Jensen & Ruback 1983; Moeller et al 2006). There are 
!0,500%&
0,000%&
0,500%&
1,000%&
1,500%&
2,000%&
2,500%&
T!2& T!1& T& T+1& T+2& T+3&
CAAR$(Total$Sample)$
AAR$(Total$Sample)$
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three possible aspects explaining these results. First, as the study is applied on the 
Scandinavian market, differences in the population examined may affect the market reactions. 
Another explanatory factor could be the focus on large deals as the announcement effect may 
have a positive relation to size. A third reason could be that most of previous empirical 
studies focus on a sample of public targets whereas this sample includes acquisitions of 
private targets as well.  
 
When examining the sample of Acquirers of Public targets the results does not have 
significant AAR over the event window, with mean values both slightly negative and positive. 
However, the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is significantly different from 
zero over the entire event window, but then only with a significance level of 10% (weak 
significance). The result indicates that the market is at least semi-strong efficient due to the 
increased AAR on the announcement day (T) and the following day (T+1) which are major 
components of CAAR as can be seen in Figure 4.2. The average abnormal return on the event 
day is 0.49 % and with a variance of 0.065 % the p-value is just above the 10% significance 
level of the sample. The failure to significantly distinguish the average abnormal returns 
(AAR) from zero is in accordance with previous empirical findings, where the main part 
shows zero or slightly negative AAR. The findings can be explained by the information 
hypothesis where publicly traded companies, which have information disclosure 
requirements, are assumed to have less information asymmetry between management and 
investors. There are two important aspects explaining the absence of abnormal returns 
surrounding the announcement of M&A when acquiring publicly traded firms. First, the 
announcement per se signals the management’s beliefs regarding future performance. 
Whether the investors interpret the signal as positive or negative will influence the markets 
valuation of the deal. In this case the announcement of an acquisition of a publicly traded firm 
seems to send neither a positive nor a negative signal to the market. Secondly, at the 
announcement certain new information regarding the specific event will be released to the 
public. In addition, for publicly traded firms there is readily available information which 
investors can include in their process of assessing the deal proposal. This information content 
seems to be enough to align future expectations of the management with the ones of the 
market, resulting in no abnormal return on average. 
 
The sample of private targets have average abnormal returns significantly different from zero 
on the event day (T), on the following day (T+1), on the third following day (T+3) and CAAR 
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significantly different from zero over the entire event window. The third following day (T+3) 
is however only significant at the 10% level. The average abnormal return on the event day 
(T) is 1.32 % with a variance of 0.075 %. Yet again there is evidence of market efficiency, at 
least semi-strong efficiency, because abnormal returns are seen immediately following an 
announcement, as illustrated in Figure 4.2. As stressed earlier, this implies that the event is 
captured in the abnormal returns and reflects the impact of new information. The abnormal 
return seen on the third day (T+3) following an announcement could either be explained as a 
delayed effect which would imply a less efficient market or as a measurement error, i.e. an 
error in the estimation of normal returns. Alternatively the results could be due to pure chance 
since the significance level is quite high.    
The result of positive abnormal returns over the event window for acquirers of private targets 
is supported by previous research (Fuller et al 2002; Draper & Paudyal 2006; Capron & Shen 
2007). The positive market reaction to the announcement of private firms can be explained in 
terms of a private firm discount, where the observed abnormal return can be explained by the 
following five factors; illiquidity, information asymmetry, payment method, bidder 
competition, and size of the acquirer. For the Scandinavian market the payment method is 
assumed to have no impact on the results since all the deals in the sample, with a few 
exceptions, are offered in cash. Furthermore the effect of bidding-competition and size cannot 
be distinguished from the results presented in Table 4.1, even though they may have an 
impact on the observed abnormal return.  
To determine whether the arguments for a private firm discount holds, the two samples need 
to be compared to each other as the former tests on the Acquiring Public targets and 
Acquiring Private targets were conducted to see if the effect is significantly different from 
zero. The Acquiring Public target sample got significantly different average abnormal returns 
(AAR) compared to the Acquiring Private target sample on the event day (T), however 
slightly above the 5% significance level indicating weak significance. On the third day 
following the announcement (T+3) and over the entire event window, AAR and CAAR of the 
samples are also significantly different. Again the effect seen on the third day following the 
announcement (T+3) can indicate either a delayed effect according to the EMH with the same 
implications as argued above, or a problem with measuring the abnormal return, or pure 
randomness. The average abnormal return on the event day (T) is only 0.49% for the sample 
Acquiring Public targets compared to 1.32% for Acquiring Private targets. Over the entire 
event window the CAAR of Acquiring Public targets is 0.93% compared to a CAAR of 
2.68% for Acquiring Private targets. The difference between Acquiring Private versus Public 
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targets is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Even though the significance is weak this can be interpreted 
as an indication of a private firm discount. 
 
Figure 4.2: Abnormal returns - Acquirers of Public and Private Targets 
 
The average abnormal returns (AAR) and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for each day over the event 
window for Acquirers of Public and Private targets. 
Source: created by the Authors 
 
According to the liquidity argument, as a private firm is more illiquid in comparison to a 
public traded firm, it should trade at a discount. This implies that the acquirer can purchase a 
private target at a lower price compared to a public target, all else being equal. The discount 
will allow for more value creation if the premium paid to the target’s shareholders is not 
increased by the same amount. As a consequence, if the abnormal return in fact is caused by 
illiquidity, the discount as an implicit synergy effect is not fully included in the premium to 
the target’s shareholders. Taking this into consideration, illiquidity could explain the positive 
abnormal return seen in Table 4.1.  
Another argument for the private firm discount is that, in contrast to public firms, private 
firms are associated with more information asymmetry and in effect exposed to higher risk of 
mispricing. Generally the market has three sources of information when assessing a target’s 
value, (1) currently available information, (2) new information released at the announcement, 
and (3) signals based on managerial decisions. For private firms the absence of market prices 
as well as limited access to financial accounts contributes to information asymmetry 
regarding current and new information. Because of the limited information in (1) and (2) the 
market will pay more attention to (3), using the signals as proxies in order to estimate the 
!0,500%&
0,000%&
0,500%&
1,000%&
1,500%&
2,000%&
2,500%&
3,000%&
3,500%&
4,000%&
4,500%&
T!2& T!1& T& T+1& T+2& T+3&
CAAR$(Acquiring$Private$Target)$
CAAR$(Acquiring$Public$Targets)$
AAR$(Acquiring$Private$Targets)$
AAR$(Acquiring$Public$Targets)$
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
58	  
  
value of the target. Nevertheless, the incomplete information content considering its quantity 
and quality will further complicate the markets ability to correctly value a private firm. Due to 
this information gap the risk of mispricing substantially increases, which will then affect the 
markets’ expectations about the deals’ impact on future cash flows.  
Rationally the relatively higher risk exposure would make investors demand a discount. The 
management of the bidding firm on the other hand may have an information advantage, due to 
possible due diligence, and is therefore more likely to make a better estimation of the target 
firm’s value.  Based on the above stated argument, the investors are assumed to evaluate the 
target firm at a lower price relative the management of an acquiring firm. A negative market 
reaction is thus expected following a bid for a private firm.   
The existence of positive abnormal returns in the private target sample is a contradicting 
result to the above discussion. However as argued by Cheng, Li and Tong (2008) an acquirer 
with less objective facts and more subjective signals are more likely to overprice the target 
company rather than to under-price it, which could explain the positive market return for the 
acquirers shareholders when acquiring private targets. It could also be explained as the 
investors’, in their assessment of the signals, believe that the management already has 
incorporated the discount in their valuation.  
 
Altogether the hypotheses are rejected for:  
(I) The Total sample where AR(T), AR(T+1) and CAR got abnormal returns 
significantly different from zero.  
(II) The Acquiring public target sample where CAR got abnormal returns weakly 
significantly different from zero.  
(III) The Acquiring private target sample where AR(T), AR(T+1) and CAR got 
abnormal returns significantly different from zero. AR(T+3) is weakly significant.  
(IV) The Acquiring public versus private target sample where AR(T), AR(T+3) and 
CAR is significantly different between the Acquiring public and private target 
samples.  
 
The market reaction is limited to the announcement day (T) and the following day (T+1) for 
the entire sample as well as for the sub-samples of acquiring private and public targets. This 
has two implications where (1) the market is efficient and, (2) there is no insider trading due 
to the absence of price run-ups.  
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The overall positive result in the investigation indicates that investors in general have a 
positive attitude considering M&As. In fact they tend to get positively surprised following an 
announcement which contradicts the theory suggesting that managerial decisions are based on 
behavioural and agency issues. Even if these problems in fact exist, the general absence of 
negative abnormal returns indicate that the market overall believes that acquisitions are driven 
by synergies rather than hubris and managerial discretion.  
The results, which are not in line with many empirical findings, could be explained as 
differences in either the conditions, associated with the Scandinavian market, or the sample. 
This thesis focuses on large firms and also includes acquisitions of private targets which both 
can be assumed to have a large impact on the results. 
The private firm discount could indeed be the reason for the outcome of this investigation. 
Even so the actual reasons driving the discount remains unanswered although illiquidity and 
information asymmetry seems like the most reasonable factors. 
4.2 Tables	  for	  Multiple	  Linear	  Regressions	  
4.2.1 Total	  Sample	  
Table 4.2: Total Sample Regression AR(T) 
 
significant at 10 % level 
*** significant at 0,1 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
The model as a whole is significant and has an Adjusted R-square of 9.3%. The coefficient ln 
Relative Size is significant at a 0.1% level and has a positive relation with abnormal returns.  
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Included'observations:'157'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
Form1(D) 0.003458 0.004353 0.794439 0.4282
ln1Deal1Size G0.002925 0.001581 G1.850584 0.0662
ln1Relative1Size 0.005641 0.001292 4.365151 0.0000 ***
Serial1Acquirer G0.002051 0.004245 G0.483033 0.6298
TPS1(D) G0.002927 0.004581 G0.638968 0.5238
C 0.038918 0.009544 4.077855 0.0001
Adjusted1R3squared 0.093296
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.000581 ***
Total1Sample
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This results are in line with previous studies (Jarrell & Poulson 1989a; Fuller et al, 2002; 
Draper & Paudyal, 2006; Misra & Gupta, 2007) which find a positive impact on the abnormal 
returns following an M&A announcement when the relative size between acquirer and target 
increases. An explanation for the relation is that the synergy effect is assumed to increase as 
the relative size increases, leading to a greater cash-flow effect.  
 
ln Deal Size is significant at a 10% level and has a negative relation with abnormal returns. 
On average the deal size affects the abnormal return negatively. When deal size increases the 
market reacts less positively than to a smaller deal. This is supported by Alexandridis, Fuller 
and Travlos (2011) who claim that large deals tend to be too large to succeed. The complexity 
in the deal prevents the integration process which ultimately hinders the realization of 
expected synergies, which suggests that it is marginally harder to gain synergy effects as the 
size of the deal increases. Another explanation is offered by Loderer and Martin (1990) who 
suggest that hubris may be causing overpayment, despite evidence of smaller premiums paid 
in large deals. This is not unreasonable as the premium, measured in percentage, does not take 
the nominal value into account, which in large deals makes the actual dollar value premium 
much greater than in small deals. If it is marginally harder to accomplish synergies when the 
deal size increases, then the negative relation of size and abnormal returns could in fact be 
explained in terms of overpayment.  
Also worth noticing is that the largest deals in this sample are for publicly traded targets, 
which could affect the results and be explained through the findings in section 4.1 as well as 
in the article by Fuller, Netter and Stegermoller (2002), where on average acquisitions of 
public firms generate a smaller abnormal return.  
 
The dummy variable Form is not significant, which implies that the market does not react any 
differently depending on whether it is a purchase of the targets stock or certain assets. The 
market does not seem to apply a discount for the assumed information asymmetry involved in 
an acquisition of assets. Possible explanations for this are that: (1) the actual information 
asymmetry is relatively small, therefore allowing the market to value the entire firm or certain 
assets within the firm on equal grounds. The large size of the deals in the sample could 
possible contribute to more coverage from media and analysts which provide the market with 
relevant information and thus even out the expectations. (2) Investors trust the management’s 
valuation on average. As discussed previously, if information asymmetry exists but investors 
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do not demand a discount it could be because the market assumes that the management has 
already included the discount themselves.    
 
The variable for Serial acquirer is not significant which implies that there is no relationship 
between serial acquirers and abnormal returns. Fuller et al (2002) argues that the markets 
perception of previous M&A activity will serve as a reference for future acquisitions. Based 
on the assumption of EMH; that the stock price reaction following the announcement only 
reflects new information released to the market, firms with an history of M&A activity will 
only experience abnormal returns when the actual announcement differs from the anticipated 
one. The absence of a relationship between serial acquirers and abnormal returns can thus be 
explained with the following argument: the information content in the average announcement 
has enough specific components to cause a discrepancy between the expected and the actual 
announcement. The market seems to react just as strongly to new information, despite 
possible differences in expectations based on previous events. The results suggest that the 
bidder being a serial acquirer does not, by itself, affect the size of abnormal returns.  
However, the possibility of a measurement error cannot be ignored. As discussed in section 
3.3.1.1, the serial acquirer effect may not be correctly captured by the quantitative proxy used 
in the regression. Another methodological issue is that there may be differences between 
serial acquirers in terms of history of previously “good” acquisitions in contrast to “bad” 
acquisitions. This heterogeneity is not captured by the simplified measure applied in this 
paper.  
 
The variable TPS, target public status, is not significant for the total sample. Even though the 
results from the t-tests above indicate a difference between Public and Private targets, the 
relation between the target public status is not strong enough to explain the variation in the 
sample. This implies that the abnormal returns observed to a large extent overlap within the 
sample and that the target firm being public or private does not explain a lower or higher 
abnormal return. 
The univariate analysis showed evidence of a private firm discount. The reason for the 
difference between the groups may on the other hand be a result of covariance with other 
explanatory variables. In the regression analysis, the explanatory power is poor.   
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Table 4.3: Total Sample Regression CAR 
 
* significant at 5 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
The coefficient of ln Relative Size is significant on the 5% level, however as the model is not 
significant as a whole the coefficients are assumed to be unstable giving unreliable results. 
The outcome follows the predictions stated in section 2.3.1; that the announcement effect is 
captured on (T) due to market efficiency and consequently there are too much noise over the 
entire event window causing problems with the underlying OLS assumptions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Included'observations:'157'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
Form1(D) >0.009884 0.007769 >1.272212 0.2053
ln1Deal1Size >0.001236 0.002998 >0.412239 0.6807
ln1Relative1Size 0.004878 0.002152 2.267076 0.0248 *
Serial1Acquirer >0.002793 0.007722 >0.361668 0.7181
TPS1(D) >0.004281 0.008069 >0.530535 0.5965
C 0.045346 0.016715 2.712932 0.0074
Adjusted1R3squared 0.017562
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.107843
Total1Sample
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4.2.2 Acquiring	  Public	  Targets	  
Table 4.4: Acquiring Public Targets Regression AR (T) (1)  
 
  significant at 10 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
The regression of AR (T) for the Acquirers of Public targets sample is only significant on a 
10% level. The sample size is quite small (64 observations after adjustments) which indicates 
that the models strength is not enough to reject the null hypotheses of the coefficients that are 
close to significance. Thus the variables Form (D) and Serial Acquirer (D) that are highly 
non-significant are removed from the model to see if the close to significant variables can be 
improved when the strength of the test increases.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
Implied1Premium ?0.010192 0.006201 ?1.643648 0.1057
ln1Deal1Size ?0.002763 0.001796 ?1.538574 0.1293
ln1Relative1Size 0.003711 0.002069 1.794166 0.0780
Serial1Acquirer ?0.005900 0.006802 ?0.867280 0.3894
Form1(D) ?0.001604 0.006643 ?0.241442 0.8101
C 0.038962 0.013625 2.859633 0.0059
Adjusted1R3squared 0.062678
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.058887
Acquiring1Public1Targets
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Table 4.5: Acquiring Public Target Regression AR(T) (2)  
 
  significant at 10 % level 
* significant at 5 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
The model is significant as a whole when removing the variables Form (D) and Serial 
Acquirer (D). The fit of the model is improved, as the Adjusted R-square is now close to 8% 
instead of 6.3% in the previous model. This indicates that the removal of the variables was 
strengthening the model.  
 
The coefficients are all significant on a 10% level but only the ln Deal Size is significant on a 
5% level. The coefficients values are not very different in this model compared to the first 
which indicates that the re-specification of the model was appropriate.  
Again, as in the total sample, the deal size has a negative relation with abnormal returns. The 
market seems to be more sceptical to larger deals as previously argued.  
 
The relative size can, as stated above, be explained as an assumption of greater cash-flows 
gained from a larger amount of synergies when the relative size increases. The results are also 
in line with Fuller, Netter and Stegermoller (2002) and Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) who finds 
that relative size has a positive relation with abnormal returns for cash offers and a negative 
relation for stock offers. Since the sample in this study mainly consists of cash offers, it could 
explain the results.  
 
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
ln1Deal1Size ?0.003322 0.001628 ?2.040823 0.0457 *
ln1Relative1Size 0.003835 0.002036 1.883492 0.0645
Implied1Premium ?0.011262 0.005774 ?1.950632 0.0558
C 0.038478 0.013869 2.774339 0.0074
Adjusted1R3squared 0.079619
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.040755 *
Acquiring1Public1Targets
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The implied premium has a negative relation to abnormal returns. As the deal size increases, 
in relation to the market value of the target, the market reacts more negatively which is in line 
with the findings of Misra and Gupta (2007). The implication is that, as the premium 
increases it should be harder for the acquiring firm to realize synergies to the same amount. 
Thus the risk of overpayment should have a positive relation with the size of the premium.  
 
Table 4.6: Acquiring Public Targets Regression CAR (1)  
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
The regression of (CAR) on the Acquirers of Public targets sample is far from significant with 
no significant coefficients, including the constant term. The explanatory power of deal size 
and relative size in particular is much different from the regressions on AR (T). The same 
procedure is done with this sample as with the regression on AR (T) above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
Implied1Premium =0.011096 0.008542 =1.299006 0.1991
ln1Deal1Size 0.001225 0.003870 0.316572 0.7527
ln1Relative1Size =0.000912 0.002759 =0.330694 0.7421
Serial1Acquirer =0.015847 0.012123 =1.307224 0.1963
Form1(D) =0.013301 0.010815 =1.229825 0.2237
C 0.022316 0.021557 1.035172 0.3049
Adjusted1R3squared 0.011571
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.270074
Acquiring1Public1Targets
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Table 4.7: Acquiring Public Targets Regression (CAR) (2)  
 
  significant at 10 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
When removing the dummy variables there are still no strong significance in the model. Only 
the Implied Premium variable is significant at the 10% level. The deal size and relative size 
has lost all of its explanatory power compared to the regression on AR(T). However, as stated 
above, the model as a whole is not significant which implies an unstable model.   
4.2.3 Acquiring	  Private	  Targets	  
Table 4.8: Acquiring Private Targets Regression AR (T)  
 
** significant at 1 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
ln1Deal1Size =0.000665 0.003142 =0.211541 0.8332
ln1Relative1Size =0.000596 0.002908 =0.205089 0.8382
Implied1Premium =0.014736 0.008509 =1.731835 0.0884
C 0.016411 0.021290 0.770825 0.4438
Adjusted1R3squared =0.014014
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.206958
Acquiring1Public1Targets
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Included'observations:'87'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
Form1(D) 0.006890 0.005878 1.172093 0.2446
ln1Deal1Size 0.001173 0.003724 0.314901 0.7536
ln1Relative1Size 0.006927 0.002112 3.280694 0.0015 **
Serial1Acquirer 0.004173 0.005758 0.724701 0.4707
C 0.019299 0.019954 0.967161 0.3363
Adjusted1R3squared 0.129592
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.006256 **
Acquiring1Private1Targets
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
67	  
  
The regression of the abnormal returns of the event day (T) for the sample of Acquiring 
Private targets yields significant results for the coefficient ln Relative Size. The model as a 
whole is significant with an Adjusted R-square of near 13%. The other variables are not close 
to significant and thus fail to explain any of the variance in AR (T).  
 
Again the relative size has a positive relation to abnormal returns for private targets which is 
in line with the results in Fuller et al (2002) where the market seems to value relatively larger 
bids more favourably.  
 
The form is as in the other models shown to have no explanatory power when it comes to 
abnormal returns in private target deals. The same arguments as stated above could explain 
this: (1) The actual information asymmetry is relatively small and, (2) the investors trust the 
managements’ valuation on average. 
The deal size is found to have no relation with abnormal returns when acquiring private 
targets. This finding contradicts the results of Alexandridis, Fuller and Travlos (2011) who 
finds a negative impact of deal size. Perhaps the spread of actual deal values are too narrow to 
have a real influence on the level of returns.  
 
The coefficient for serial acquirer is also non-significant and the same discussion as above can 
be applied here as well. Despite possible differences in expectations based on previous events, 
the market seems to react just as strongly to new information. This implies that the history of 
previous acquisitions alone does not affect the size of abnormal returns.  
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Table 4.9: Acquiring Private Targets Regression CAR  
 
* significant at 5 % level 
** significant at 1 % level 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
The regression on CAR over the event window for the sample of Acquiring Private targets is 
also significant but with a much smaller fit (Adjusted R-square of 4.7%). The significant 
variable is again ln Relative Size while the other variables remain highly non-significant. The 
results has the same implication as the discussion of AR(T) in the private sample above.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Included'observations:'87'after'adjustments
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob
Form1(D) 0.001617 0.011208 0.144279 0.8856
ln1Deal1Size 0.002339 0.005761 0.406011 0.6858
ln1Relative1Size 0.009705 0.002994 3.241753 0.0017 **
Serial1Acquirer G0.000395 0.011051 G0.035726 0.9716
C 0.038961 0.031250 1.246751 0.2160
Adjusted1R3squared 0.047380
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.010769 *
Acquiring1Private1Targets
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5 CONCLUSION	  
In this final chapter the authors ties the purpose of the thesis to the results and answers the 
research questions followed by a further discussion of the most relevant findings. Finally 
proposals for future research are presented.  
 
The varying results in previous research, regarding the value creation for acquiring firms, 
motivated an investigation of the announcement effect. Furthermore, most empirical work has 
been conducted on the U.S. or the U.K. markets and for deals where public firms bid for 
public targets, ignoring potential differences in market settings and the target’s public status.  
The purpose of this thesis was therefore to examine the announcement effect for acquiring 
companies in Scandinavia, where the emphasis lied on the difference between acquiring 
Public targets compared to Private targets. The authors further aimed to investigate the 
relation between abnormal returns and variables found significant in previous research.  
 
The results show an overall significant positive market return following announcements of 
acquisitions. When examining the differences between acquisitions of public versus private 
firms the findings are as expected; the value creation in bids for public targets is significantly 
smaller than for private targets, where an acquiring firm’s shareholders receive 2.7% 
cumulative abnormal return on average in private target deals. In bids for public targets there 
is a slight value creation on average which is only weakly significant, making the results hard 
to generalize. The findings support the notation of a private firm discount and the first 
question can therefore be answered as follows: There is a difference in the announcement 
effect for an acquiring company when a bid is made for a public target compared to a private 
target.  
 
When addressing the reasoning behind the above conclusion it is essential to highlight other 
important implications of the results. Altogether the findings could be interpreted as an 
evidence of market efficiency, which is a strong assumption for the validity of further 
analysis. The existence of abnormal returns can through EMH be explained as changes in the 
markets expectations since only the unpredicted part of the deal should be reflected in the 
stock price. It is thus only discrepancies between the markets and the management’s 
expectations of future value creation that should cause abnormal returns following an M&A 
announcement. The divergence of expectations could in turn be approached based on two 
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different assumptions; (1) If the management and investors are rational the positive abnormal 
returns would simply reflect the expected value creation of the deal, i.e. the amount which the 
expected synergies exceeds the premium offered. (2) If instead irrational elements distort the 
market, e.g. behavioural factors influencing managers and/or investors, the expectations could 
be based on biased calculations. The positive results could then be explained as a systematic 
overestimation (underestimation) by the market (management). Nevertheless it is important to 
notice that the occurrence of irrational influences causing mispricing does not rule out the 
existence of partially rational decisions. Thus the observed positive market reactions could be 
thought of as a rational assessment of the intrinsic synergies with a potential degree of biases.  
The implication of the above discussion for the results of a private firm discount follows the 
two approaches: (1) Assuming rationality, there is an actual superior value enhancement in 
acquisitions of private firms compared to acquiring public targets. (2) Assuming irrationality, 
there are greater risks for mispricing in valuing private targets.  
 
The authors believe illiquidity and information asymmetry to be the two main explanatory 
elements for the observed private firm discount. The illiquidity of private firms make 
investors demand a discount based on the lower marketability, i.e. higher risk exposure. When 
an acquirer thus consolidates a private firm the equity becomes more liquid, less risky and 
consequently worth more to a shareholder. This provides a private target deal with an 
additional synergy compared to a public target deal, all other things being equal. The amount 
of this financial synergy, like the value of any other synergy, could however be transferred to 
the target firm’s shareholders through an increased premium. Even so, following the rational 
argument, the findings in this thesis suggest that the value is captured by the acquiring firm. If 
on the other hand the degree of irrationality is high in the market, the results indicate that the 
investors (management) tend to systematically overestimate (underestimate) the size of this 
illiquidity discount.  
The relatively greater information asymmetry in private firms may also contribute to the 
private firm discount as it becomes harder to correctly value the firm which make managers 
and investors demand a discount for the increased uncertainty. The rational argument is that 
the bidding firm reduces the offer price in response to the threat of adverse selection. Positive 
market return can thus be explained as the investors expect this discount to be implemented. 
The markets tendency to react positively to more obscure targets may also be explained in 
terms of irrationality on the market. The investor’s judgment could be affected by the 
availability heuristic; where the investors rely on readily available information instead of 
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more relevant but less salient contents. Attention is drawn to the expressed confidence of the 
management in their motivations of their bid and the associated signals. The evaluation is thus 
comprised with more subjective inputs which may cause investors to misprice the deal. In 
addition, investors could be excessively optimistic and over confident when it comes to 
assessing the expected synergies in deals with less available information.  
Altogether these arguments could serve to explain the private firm discount observed in this 
thesis.   
 
When turning to the second research question, regarding the determinants of abnormal 
returns, the main findings are that; (1) for the total sample the relative size and the deal size is 
the only variables that have a significant effect for abnormal returns, (2) for the public target 
sample the deal size, relative size and implied premium serves to explain the abnormal 
returns, and (3) for the private target sample the relative size is the only significant 
explanatory variable.   
The results from the Scandinavian market are thus in accordance with findings in previous 
research based on the U.S. and the U.K markets in terms of the relative size but also when it 
comes to the premium and the deal size in bids for public targets.  
The influence of relative size on abnormal returns can be explained with the following line of 
reasoning: As the deal size increases in relation to the acquirer’s market value, the size, and in 
effect the impact of the anticipated synergies is greater than in an acquisition of a relatively 
smaller target. The positive relation ultimately suggests that the market on average believes 
that the acquirer captures a part of the value creation, i.e. the synergies exceed the premium 
offered for the target.   
As the implied premium and deal size increase, in acquisitions of public targets, the abnormal 
return tends to respond negatively. When the premium is amplified the expected value 
creation in the acquiring company could reasonably become reduced as the anticipated 
synergies must be increased with at least the same amount. Also, the complexity in nominally 
larger deals could make the synergies harder to realize.  
 
The non-significant results across the board for the variables form and serial acquirer indicate 
that: (1) the Scandinavian market seems to react equally to new information, despite any 
differences in expectations based on previous events. The results suggest that the bidder being 
a serial acquirer does not, by itself, affect the size of abnormal returns.  
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(2) The Scandinavian market is associated with less information asymmetry in regards to the 
cash-flow effect of certain assets in acquisitions of assets, or the investors trust the 
management to implement a discount. The findings implies that the type of acquisition; 
whether the bid is for stock or assets, does not affect the value creation in an average deal.  
 
According to the authors, the most relevant results found in this thesis can be summarised as 
follows:  
(i) Statistically significant evidence of positive abnormal returns is found for the total 
sample, which indicate that the market generally believe that large deals create 
value for acquiring firms in Scandinavia.  
(ii) Acquisitions of privately held companies tend to create more value than deals for 
publicly traded firms, supporting the private firm discount.  
(iii) The relative size is found to have a generally positive impact on acquisitions, 
while deal size and premium is found to have a negative relation in acquisitions of 
public targets.     
 
5.1 Proposed	  future	  research	  
The results from this thesis generate new questions and aspects worth investigating:  
- One suggestion to provide further evidence is to widening the scope of this thesis by 
including more variables in the regression, such as key metrics and motives for synergies. 
- The scope could also be widened by including data from other markets and a larger 
timespan.     
- Another possibility is to replicate this thesis on other markets with different settings.  
- An interesting aspect would be to see whether, and how, bid competition influences 
abnormal returns.   
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7 APPENDICES	  	  
APPENDIX	  1:	  Definitions	  	  
Abnormal return 
The difference between the expected return and the actual return. 
 
Acquisition of asset  
Assets and liabilities are sold to an acquirer who can specifically choose which assets and 
liabilities it prefers. The procedure is complex and rather expensive as the ownership and title 
of the assets has to be transferred to the new entity. (Ross et al, 2002 p. 820) 
 
Acquisition of stock 
The acquirer purchases the target company’s stocks in exchange for cash, or securities, or 
both. All assets and liabilities are transferred to the acquiring company. The deal can be 
completed though a tender offer.  (Ross et al 2002, p. 820) 
 
Announcement day 
The official day when the information about an M&A is confirmed to the public (Ross et al, 
2002 p. 842). 
 
Average abnormal return (AAR) 
The mean value of the sample of abnormal returns calculated for each cross-sectional entity. 
 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
The sum of the difference between the expected return and actual return over the whole event 
window (Ross et al, 2002 p. 920). 
 
Cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) 
The mean value of the sample of aggregated abnormal returns over the event window for each 
cross-sectional unit.  
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Merger/ consolidation  
Two companies create an entirely new company i.e. new stocks are issued. Should be 
approved by the shareholders of both merger partners, with at least 50% of the each firm’s 
shareholders vote. (Brealey et al 2011, 571; Ross et al 2002, 817)  
 
Premium 
An asset is selling above its face value (Ross et al, 2002 p. 928). 
 
Private target 
A privately held firm, whose shares are not traded on a stock exchange, acquired by a public 
bidder/acquirer 
 
Public target 
A publicly listed company, whose shares are listed on a stock exchange, acquired by a public 
bidder/acquirer 
 
Risk premium 
The difference between the expected return on risky assets and the risk return on risk free 
assets (Ross et al, 2002 p. 934). 
 
Synergy 
The combination of two entities is more valuable then the sum of the parts (Gaughan 2011, 
628). Further explained in section 2.1.2. 
 
Takeover 
Refers to a transfer of control from one shareholder group to another. Can be either friendly 
or hostile. (Ross et al, 2002 p. 817) 
 
Tender offer 
Public offer to buy shares of a target company (Ross et al 2002, 820). 
 
The private firm discount 
A discount found present in the value of shares for privately held firms (Fuller et al, 2002). 
Further explained in section 2.5. 
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APPENDIX	  2:	  M&A	  activity	  in	  Scandinavia	  between	  2004	  and	  2013	  
 
 
The data represent the number acquisitions made by Scandinavian publicly traded companies between 2004 and 2014. The 
total number of acquisitions made by public Scandinavian companies was 17 786 deals where Sweden accounted for 7 764 
deals, Norway 4 316 deals, Denmark 3 017 deals and Finland 2 689 deals (Tomas Reuter DataStream 2014). Companies 
representing Sweden are all trading on the Stockholm Exchange, the Danish companies on Copenhagen Exchange, the 
Finish companies on the Helsinki Exchange and Norwegian companies on the Oslo Exchange. 
Source: created by the Authors 
 
APPENDIX	  4:	  M&A	  activity	  in	  Scandinavia	  Public	  and	  Private	  target	  
 
The data represent the number of acquisitions of public and private targets made by Scandinavian publicly traded companies 
between 2004 and 2014. 
Source: created by the Authors 
 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total
2004 270 250 235 482 1237
2005 286 266 358 642 1552
2006 248 307 406 837 1798
2007 380 310 545 1089 2324
2008 339 376 418 835 1968
2009 321 213 329 651 1514
2010 321 287 484 860 1952
2011 317 294 580 925 2116
2012 264 204 513 734 1715
2013 271 182 448 709 1610
Total 3017 2689 4316 7764 17786
+% 17% 15% 24% 44%
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total
Public 156 150 309 336 951
Private 338 542 561 1724 3165
Total 494 692 870 2060 4116
Pricing Difficulties in Mergers & Acquisitions - Public versus Private target 
81	  
  
APPENDIX	  5:	  Index	  M&A	  activity	  
 
Index M&A activity in the U.S., the U.K. and Scandinavia between 2004 and 2013. 
Source: created by the Authors 
APPENDIX	  6:	  Regression	  Tables	  
Table 1.1: Total sample AR (T) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/11/14'''Time:'11:51
Sample'(adjusted):'1'175
Included'observations:'157'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityKconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.1
Form1(D) 0.003458 0.004353 0.794439 0.4282
ln1Deal1Size K0.002925 0.001581 K1.850584 0.0662
ln1Relative1Size 0.005641 0.001292 4.365151 0.0000
Serial1Acquirer K0.002051 0.004245 K0.483033 0.6298
TPS1(D) K0.002927 0.004581 K0.638968 0.5238
C 0.038918 0.009544 4.077855 0.0001
R3squared 0.122357 Mean1dependent1var 0.009456
Adjusted1R3squared 0.093296 S.D.1dependent1var 0.026687
S.E.1of1regression 0.025411 Akaike1info1criterion K4.469779
Sum1squared1resid 0.097506 Schwarz1criterion K4.352980
Log1likelihood 356.8777 Hannan3Quinn1criter. K4.422343
F3statistic 4.210346 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.994192
Prob(F3statistic) 0.001304 Wald1F3statistic 4.633007
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.000581
Total1Sample1AR1(T)
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Table 1.2: Total sample sample CAR 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Table 1.3: Acquiring Public targets sample AR (T) (1) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/11/14'''Time:'11:54
Sample'(adjusted):'1'175
Included'observations:'157'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityLconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
Form1(D) L0.009884 0.007769 L1.272212 0.2053
ln1Deal1Size L0.001236 0.002998 L0.412239 0.6807
ln1Relative1Size 0.004878 0.002152 2.267076 0.0248
Serial1Acquirer L0.002793 0.007722 L0.361668 0.7181
TPS1(D) L0.004281 0.008069 L0.530535 0.5965
C 0.045346 0.016715 2.712932 0.0074
R3squared 0.049050 Mean1dependent1var 0.018280
Adjusted1R3squared 0.017562 1S.D.1dependent1var 0.045902
S.E.1of1regression 0.045497 Akaike1info1criterion L3.304883
Sum1squared1resid 0.312564 Schwarz1criterion L3.188084
Log1likelihood 265.4333 Hannan3Quinn1criter. L3.257447
F3statistic 1.557723 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.894608
Prob(F3statistic) 0.175432 Wald1F3statistic 1.842566
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.107843
Total1Sample1CAR
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/11/14'''Time:'12:02
Sample'(adjusted):'1'78
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityNconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
Implied1Premium N0.010192 0.006201 N1.643648 0.1057
ln1Deal1Size N0.002763 0.001796 N1.538574 0.1293
ln1Relative1Size 0.003711 0.002069 1.794166 0.0780
Serial1Acquirer N0.005900 0.006802 N0.867280 0.3894
Form1(D) N0.001604 0.006643 N0.241442 0.8101
C 0.038962 0.013625 2.859633 0.0059
R3squared 0.137069 Mean1dependent1var 0.005672
Adjusted1R3squared 0.062678 S.D.1dependent1var 0.025198
S.E.1of1regression 0.024396 Akaike1info1criterion N4.499767
Sum1squared1resid 0.034518 Schwarz1criterion N4.297372
Log1likelihood 149.9926 Hannan3Quinn1criter. N4.420033
F3statistic 1.842558 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.729048
Prob(F3statistic) 0.118742 Wald1F3statistic 2.274150
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.058887
Acquiring1Public1Targets1AR(T)1(1)
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Table 1.4: Acquiring Public targets sample AR (T) (2) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Table 1.5: Acquiring Public targets sample CAR (1) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/10/14'''Time:'17:37
Sample'(adjusted):'1'78
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityNconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
ln1Deal1Size N0.003322 0.001628 N2.040823 0.0457
ln1Relative1Size 0.003835 0.002036 1.883492 0.0645
Implied1Premium N0.011262 0.005774 N1.950632 0.0558
C 0.038478 0.013869 2.774339 0.0074
R3squared 0.123447 Mean1dependent1var 0.005672
Adjusted1R3squared 0.079619 S.D.1dependent1var 0.025198
S.E.1of1regression 0.024174 Akaike1info1criterion N4.546604
Sum1squared1resid 0.035063 Schwarz1criterion N4.411674
Log1likelihood 149.4913 Hannan3Quinn1criter. N4.493448
F3statistic 2.816634 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.716343
Prob(F3statistic) 0.046633 Wald1F3statistic 2.929891
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.040755
Acquiring1Public1Targets1AR(T)1(2)
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/11/14'''Time:'12:05
Sample'(adjusted):'1'78
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityOconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
Implied1Premium O0.011096 0.008542 O1.299006 0.1991
ln1Deal1Size 0.001225 0.003870 0.316572 0.7527
ln1Relative1Size O0.000912 0.002759 O0.330694 0.7421
Serial1Acquirer O0.015847 0.012123 O1.307224 0.1963
Form1(D) O0.013301 0.010815 O1.229825 0.2237
C 0.022316 0.021557 1.035172 0.3049
R3squared 0.090018 Mean1dependent1var 0.007603
Adjusted1R3squared 0.011571 S.D.1dependent1var 0.041402
S.E.1of1regression 0.041162 Akaike1info1criterion O3.453555
Sum1squared1resid 0.098269 Schwarz1criterion O3.251160
Log1likelihood 116.5138 Hannan3Quinn1criter. O3.373822
F3statistic 1.147502 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.960404
Prob(F3statistic) 0.346019 Wald1F3statistic 1.315852
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.270074
Acquiring1Public1Targets1CAR1(1)
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Table 1.6: Acquiring Public targets sample CAR (2) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Table 1.7: Acquiring Private targets sample AR (T) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/10/14'''Time:'17:43
Sample'(adjusted):'1'78
Included'observations:'64'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityOconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
ln1Deal1Size O0.000665 0.003142 O0.211541 0.8332
ln1Relative1Size O0.000596 0.002908 O0.205089 0.8382
Implied1Premium O0.014736 0.008509 O1.731835 0.0884
C 0.016411 0.021290 0.770825 0.4438
R3squared 0.034272 Mean1dependent1var 0.007603
Adjusted1R3squared O0.014014 S.D.1dependent1var 0.041402
S.E.1of1regression 0.041691 Akaike1info1criterion O3.456599
Sum1squared1resid 0.104289 Schwarz1criterion O3.321668
Log1likelihood 114.6112 Hannan3Quinn1criter. O3.403443
F3statistic 0.709775 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.909632
Prob(F3statistic) 0.549957 Wald1F3statistic 1.566051
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.206958
Acquiring1Public1Targets1CAR1(2)
Dependent'Variable:'AR'(T)
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/11/14'''Time:'12:07
Sample'(adjusted):'1'97
Included'observations:'87'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityNconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
Form1(D) 0.006890 0.005878 1.172093 0.2446
ln1Deal1Size 0.001173 0.003724 0.314901 0.7536
ln1Relative1Size 0.006927 0.002112 3.280694 0.0015
Serial1Acquirer 0.004173 0.005758 0.724701 0.4707
C 0.019299 0.019954 0.967161 0.3363
R3squared 0.170076 Mean1dependent1var 0.013167
Adjusted1R3squared 0.129592 S.D.1dependent1var 0.027456
S.E.1of1regression 0.025615 Akaike1info1criterion N4.435519
Sum1squared1resid 0.053803 Schwarz1criterion N4.293800
Log1likelihood 197.9451 Hannan3Quinn1criter. N4.378453
F3statistic 4.201059 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.837499
Prob(F3statistic) 0.003821 Wald1F3statistic 3.870327
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.006256
Acquiring1Private1Targets1AR(T)
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Table 1.8: Acquiring private targets sample CAR 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
APPENDIX	  7:	  Correlation	  Matrix	  
Table 1.9: Total sample AR (T) 
 
 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Dependent'Variable:'CAR
Method:'Least'Squares
Date:'05/11/14'''Time:'12:17
Sample'(adjusted):'1'97
Included'observations:'87'after'adjustments
White'heteroskedasticityOconsistent'standard'errors'&'covariance
Variable Coefficient Std.1Error t3Statistic Prob.11
Form1(D) 0.001617 0.011208 0.144279 0.8856
ln1Deal1Size 0.002339 0.005761 0.406011 0.6858
ln1Relative1Size 0.009705 0.002994 3.241753 0.0017
Serial1Acquirer O0.000395 0.011051 O0.035726 0.9716
C 0.038961 0.031250 1.246751 0.2160
R3squared 0.091688 Mean1dependent1var 0.026785
Adjusted1R3squared 0.047380 S.D.1dependent1var 0.050237
S.E.1of1regression 0.049032 Akaike1info1criterion O3.136923
Sum1squared1resid 0.197141 Schwarz1criterion O2.995205
Log1likelihood 141.4562 Hannan3Quinn1criter. O3.079858
F3statistic 2.069329 Durbin3Watson1stat 1.845907
Prob(F3statistic) 0.092295 Wald1F3statistic 3.507501
Prob(Wald1F3statistic) 0.010769
Acquiring1Private1Targets1CAR
Total&Sample&AR(T)
Covariance*Analysis:*Ordinary
Date:*05/24/14***Time:*18:18
Sample*(adjusted):*1*175
Included*observations:*175*after*adjustments
Balanced*sample*(listwise*missing*value*deletion)
Correlation
Probability
AR(T)& 1.000000
KKKKK*
ln&Deal&Size& K0.031101 1.000000
0.6828 KKKKK*
ln&Relative&Size& 0.199413 0.293632 1.000000
0.0082 0.0001 KKKKK*
Serial&Acquirer&(D)& 0.103122 0.226264 0.042406 1.000000
0.1745 0.0026 0.5774 KKKKK*
TPS&(D) K0.134047 0.298705 0.020103 0.002136 1.000000
0.0770 0.0001 0.7917 0.9776 KKKKK*
Form&(D) 0.027608 0.188581 0.086863 0.067952 0.341528 1.000000
0.7169 0.0124 0.2530 0.3716 0.0000 KKKKK*
AR(T)& ln&Deal&Size& ln&Relative&Size& Serial&Acquirer&(D)& TPS&(D) Form&(D)
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Table 1.10: Total sample CAR 
 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
Table 1.11: Acquiring Public target sample AR (T) 
 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
 
 
 
Total&Sample&CAR
Covariance*Analysis:*Ordinary
Date:*05/24/14***Time:*18:31
Sample*(adjusted):*1*175
Included*observations:*157*after*adjustments
Balanced*sample*(listwise*missing*value*deletion)
Correlation
Probability
CAR 1.000000
LLLLL*
Form&(D) L0.127260 1.000000
0.1122 LLLLL*
ln&Deal&Size& L0.024157 0.207440 1.000000
0.7639 0.0091 LLLLL*
ln&Relative&Size& 0.161633 0.039493 0.308847 1.000000
0.0431 0.6234 0.0001 LLLLL*
Serial&Acquirer&(D)& L0.035547 0.054982 0.220467 0.042730 1.000000
0.6585 0.4940 0.0055 0.5952 LLLLL*
TPS&(D) L0.089899 0.371042 0.287410 0.038518 L0.018420 1.000000
0.2628 0.0000 0.0003 0.6320 0.8189 LLLLL*
TPS&(D)CAR Form&(D) ln&Deal&Size& ln&Relative&Size& Serial&Acquirer&(D)&
Acquiring)Public)Target)Sample)AR(T))
Covariance*Analysis:*Ordinary
Date:*05/24/14***Time:*18:36
Sample*(adjusted):*1*78
Included*observations:*64*after*adjustments
Balanced*sample*(listwise*missing*value*deletion)
Correlation
Probability
AR(T) 1.000000
MMMMM*
ln)Deal)Size M0.165306 1.000000
0.1918 MMMMM*
ln)Relative)Size 0.161387 0.316927 1.000000
0.2027 0.0107 MMMMM*
Serial)Acquirer)(D)) M0.194885 0.286370 0.053727 1.000000
0.1228 0.0218 0.6733 MMMMM*
Form)(D) M0.086581 0.151343 0.027057 0.128716 1.000000
0.4963 0.2326 0.8319 0.3107 MMMMM*
Implied)Premium M0.191785 0.099250 0.174526 0.168813 0.106125 1.000000
0.1290 0.4352 0.1678 0.1824 0.4039 MMMMM*
AR(T)) ln)Deal)Size) ln)Relative)Size) Serial)Acquirer)(D)) Form)(D) Implied)Premium
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Table 1.12: Acquiring Public target sample CAR  
 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
Table 1.13: Acquiring Private target sample AR (T) 
 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
 
 
 
Acquiring)Public)Target)Sample)CAR)
Covariance*Analysis:*Ordinary
Date:*05/24/14***Time:*18:44
Sample*(adjusted):*1*78
Included*observations:*64*after*adjustments
Balanced*sample*(listwise*missing*value*deletion)
Correlation
Probability
CAR 1.000000
MMMMM*
Implied)Premium M0.179606 1.000000
0.1556 MMMMM*
ln)Deal)Size M0.050551 0.072948 1.000000
0.6916 0.5667 MMMMM*
ln)Relative)Size M0.060697 0.140956 0.340917 1.000000
0.6338 0.2666 0.0058 MMMMM*
Serial)Acquirer)(D)) M0.220244 0.170454 0.307586 0.062938 1.000000
0.0803 0.1781 0.0134 0.6213 MMMMM*
Form)(D) M0.175525 0.102256 0.154387 0.057408 0.145479 1.000000
0.1653 0.4214 0.2232 0.6523 0.2514 MMMMM*
Form)(D)CAR Implied)Premium ln)Relative)Size)ln)Deal)Size) Serial)Acquirer)(D))
Acquiring)Private)Target)Sample)AR(T)
Covariance*Analysis:*Ordinary
Date:*05/24/14***Time:*18:50
Sample*(adjusted):*1*97
Included*observations:*87*after*adjustments
Balanced*sample*(listwise*missing*value*deletion)
Correlation
Probability
AR(T) 1.000000
LLLLL*
ln)Deal)Size 0.161377 1.000000
0.1354 LLLLL*
ln)Relative)Size 0.382046 0.280865 1.000000
0.0003 0.0084 LLLLL*
Serial)Acquirer)(D)) 0.061368 0.245692 L0.079475 1.000000
0.5723 0.0218 0.4643 LLLLL*
Form)(D) 0.160737 0.027915 0.094022 0.046954 1.000000
0.1369 0.7974 0.3864 0.6658 LLLLL*
AR(T)) ln)Deal)Size) ln)Relative)Size) Serial)Acquirer)(D)) Form)(D)
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Table 1.14: Acquiring Private target sample CAR 
 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
	  
APPENDIX	  8:	  Normality	  Regression	  Tables	  
Table 1.15: Total sample AR (T) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
 
 
Acquiring)Private)Target)Sample)CAR
Covariance*Analysis:*Ordinary
Date:*05/24/14***Time:*18:52
Sample*(adjusted):*1*97
Included*observations:*87*after*adjustments
Balanced*sample*(listwise*missing*value*deletion)
Correlation
Probability
CAR 1.000000
LLLLL*
ln)Deal)Size 0.120737 1.000000
0.2653 LLLLL*
ln)Relative)Size 0.300156 0.285182 1.000000
0.0047 0.0074 LLLLL*
Serial)Acquirer)(D)) L0.013054 0.201480 L0.063024 1.000000
0.9045 0.0613 0.5620 LLLLL*
Form)(D) 0.042497 0.008870 0.092887 0.061636 1.000000
0.6959 0.9350 0.3922 0.5706 LLLLL*
ln)Deal)Size) ln)Relative)Size) Serial)Acquirer)(D)) Form)(D)CAR
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Table 1.16: Total sample CAR 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
Table 1.17: Acquiring Public target sample AR (T) (1) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Table 1.18: Acquiring Public target sample AR (T) (2) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
Table 1.19: Acquiring Public target sample CAR (1) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Table 1.20: Acquiring Public target sample CAR (2) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
 
Table 1.21: Acquiring Private target sample AR (T) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Table 1.22: Acquiring Private target sample CAR 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
APPENDIX	  9:	  Normality	  test	  T-­‐test	  
Table 1.23: Total sample AR (T) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Table 1.24: Total sample CAR 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Table 1.25: Acquiring Public target sample AR (T)  
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Table 1.27: Acquiring Public target sample CAR (1) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
 
Table 1.29: Acquiring Private target sample AR (T) 
 
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
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Table 1.30: Acquiring Private target sample CAR 
	  
Source: created by the Authors using EViews 
APPENDIX	  10:	  Total	  data	  sample	  
Table 1.31: Data overview  
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